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Abstract 
Insider threats can pose a great risk to organizations and by their very nature are 
difficult to protect against. Auditing and system logging are capabilities present in most 
operating systems and can be used for detecting insider activity.  However, current 
auditing methods are typically applied in a haphazard way, if at all, and are not conducive 
to contributing to an effective insider threat security policy.  This research develops a 
methodology for designing a customized auditing and logging template for a Linux 
operating system. An intent-based insider threat risk assessment methodology is 
presented to create use case scenarios tailored to address an organization‟s specific 
security needs and priorities.  These organization specific use cases are verified to be 
detectable via the Linux auditing and logging subsystems and the results are analyzed to 
create an effective auditing rule set and logging configuration for the detectable use 
cases.  Results indicate that creating a customized auditing rule set and system logging 
configuration to detect insider threat activity is possible. 
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A DEVELOPMENT OF A METHODOLOGY FOR CUSTOMIZING INSIDER 
THREAT AUDITING ON A LINUX OPERATING SYSTEM 
 
 
I. Introduction 
In today‟s world, computers are an integral part of everyday life.  Their integrity 
and security becomes increasingly important as people come to rely on information 
technology.  As such, computer security has become a major field of concern both in the 
commercial and government sectors.  While external attacks have resulted in large 
amounts of research since the early 90‟s, in comparison, relatively little research has been 
devoted to insider threat detection. 
1.1 Research Motivation 
Despite the disparity in research, the more severe security incidents can be 
attributed to insider threat [2].  As with any cyber attack, these threats may be motivated 
by a number of factors ranging from greed to disgruntlement.  The significant difference 
between an external attacker and an insider is the insider is often behind the extensive 
security infrastructure that ensures our computer system‟s integrity.  Because insiders 
already know the system, their ability to wreak havoc, theft, or any other malicious 
behavior is more easily achieved than by an outside attacker. 
Although insider threats are not new, they are of significant concern.  The value 
of enterprise data on a worldwide scale has provided a tantalizing incentive to abuse 
privileges given to trusted workers.  For example, in the United Kingdom, personal 
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records pilfered from databases are worth approximately ₤4-8 ($8-13, USD) per record 
[1].  Operation Firewall, an investigations conducted by the US Secret Service, resulted 
in the arrest of a group trafficking in at least 1.7 million credit card numbers and other 
personal data worth ₤2 billion ($3 billion, USD) on the open market [1].  The Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse reported that from January 2005 to January 2008, more than 218 
million records of personal information were stolen in the United States alone [1].  
While preventing insider threat is a key component of protecting an information 
system, they are difficult to identify and resolve by their very nature [2].  Traditional 
security defenses concentrate on the external threat and are unsuited to the detection and 
prevention of insider activity.  Currently there is no complete solution since any security 
measures put into place, whether by policy or technology, require the user have 
legitimate access to the system at some level.  Technologically, monitoring and detecting 
insider issues can be a daunting task.  Current thought is to move towards monitoring 
rather than preventing and using concepts currently employed in intrusion detection 
systems [1][2]. 
While Linux offers an auditing subsystem to log events from the kernel and user 
domains, its default use depends on the distribution used.  In addition, general guidelines 
exist that direct enabling of the auditing subsystem, such as DISA UNIX STIG V5R1 
[33], but tailoring these guidelines into a specific strategy or template on a Linux system 
is still needed. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Defending against insider attacks is and will remain challenging.  For the most 
part, traditional computer security defenses will not suffice. It will take a combination of 
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things including technical means, processes, and policy.  Despite the need for a 
comprehensive security mechanism to enforce and monitor system usage to mitigate 
insider threat, there is no common methodology to determine what data needs to be 
collected or analyzed for the technical portion of this defense.  A simple and unexplored 
approach to collecting this data is to use system and audit logs.  Since these records can 
contain all events on a device, they record both normal and abnormal activity and 
therefore can be utilized in signature-based methods to detect insider threat.  A careful 
consideration of how a system should be audited is warranted to help defend against such 
attacks.  Currently, there is no defined methodology for creating such a customized 
auditing template for Linux systems.  Therefore, the purpose of this research is to develop 
a methodology to create a comprehensive auditing policy to detect insider threat on a 
Linux operating system. 
1.3 Assumptions 
In order to develop an auditing strategy, an organization must have identified its 
security requirements to ensure a properly defined strategy or template.  This includes 
understanding the organization‟s critical information and potential threats to that 
information.  The risk assessment this entails needs to also include the potential impact of 
an information breach.  Based on this assessment, the impact of these vulnerabilities can 
be prioritized to drive the security requirements in this study.   
1.4 Scope 
While there are a plethora of threats to a computer system from both the outside 
and inside, the focus of this study is on malicious insider threat because of its inherent 
difficulty in detecting and mitigating insider threat risks.  It is proposed that a properly 
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configured auditing system can be effective in detecting such threats.  Due to the large 
number of Linux distributions available, this research focuses on the analysis of a local 
workstation running Ubuntu v9.10, a popular desktop Linux variation. 
1.5 Overview 
One must first identify the threats and understand an insider‟s intentions and 
actions before determining the viability of auditing as an insider threat countermeasure.  
King [3][4] developed a process to identify such threats in an organization by extending 
the Insider Threat Functional Decomposition Model (ITFDM).  Once the threats and 
vulnerabilities to an organization have been recognized, a process to develop an effective 
auditing policy must be developed in a rational and methodical way.  Levoy‟s [5] work 
studied the efficient auditing settings on a Windows operating system to create a 
customized security template to detect insider threat. 
This research applies the same concepts to the Linux operating system while 
using King‟s research to develop use cases or risks.  By utilizing King‟s methodology, an 
organization can identify possible insider threat risks and test the ability of Linux 
auditing to detect such threats as posited by Levoy [5].  By performing content analysis 
of current insider threat activities and risk analysis, use case scenarios specific to the 
organization can be developed.  These use cases can then be tested to determine whether 
such insider attacks are detectable using the Linux logging and auditing capabilities.  By 
analyzing the results of such tests a customizable auditing and logging template 
customized to an organization‟s specific vulnerabilities and needs may be created.   
Combining the efforts of these prior studies an organization can develop a more rigorous 
and methodical process to create insider threat auditing templates. 
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1.6 Thesis Organization 
This chapter has served as a brief introduction to the proposed problem and the 
reasoning and motivation for this line of research.  Chapter 2 presents an overview of 
insider threat and background information pertaining to this research.  Chapter 3 
describes the methodology, experiment setup, and calculations used in this research.  
Chapter 4 describes a notional example to demonstrate the proposed methodology.  
Chapter 5 draws some conclusions from this research and recommendations for 
additional research in the area of auditing templates for insider threat. 
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II. Background 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the necessary background information and concepts 
germane to this research.  It presents the current thinking and trends of insider threat 
research and discusses current audit log usage in monitoring workstation activity in an 
organization.  The chapter first discusses the information security in general and leads 
into a definition of insider threat.  Current avenues of insider threat detection and 
mitigation will be covered and then lead into a discussion of system auditing and logging 
and its current uses.  The chapter finishes with how auditing and logging may assist in the 
detection and mitigation of insider threat. 
2.2. Information Security 
Information security is a general term that covers a wide area of information 
processing, while maintaining usability.  Organizations today depend on computer 
systems to conduct business and access information every day.  In some organizations, 
the availability and integrity of data can be the difference between success and failure. 
Information security has evolved over the years and the popularity of the Internet 
was one of the driving factors that intensified efforts in information security.  An ever-
growing number of organizations use computers to access resources that the Internet has 
to offer. From information access to electronic mail, the Internet could be thought of as 
one of the more important developments of the 20
th
 century. 
Due to the legacy of today‟s Internet based on the trust-based communication of 
its predecessor ARPANET, the Internet Protocol was not designed with security in mind.   
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The TCP/IP communications stack is open to malicious users and processes across the 
network due to a lack of security standards built into the protocol [6].  While 
developments have been made to secure Internet communications, incidents still occur to 
remind people that security is still an important issue. 
Most industries rely on regulations and rules that are set by agreed upon standards 
and governed by cooperative committees or bodies.  The same is true for information 
security. Many security consultants, vendors and the US government agree upon the 
standard security model known as CIA, or Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability [7]. 
This model is an accepted component to assessing information security risks and 
establishing security policy. 
The National Institute of Standards, via the Federal Information Processing 
Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 199, succinctly describes the goals of these three 
objectives.  The goal of confidentiality is to prevent or minimize unauthorized access to 
and disclosure of data or information [7][8].  Integrity pertains to the correctness of the 
data or ensuring the data is free from unauthorized or improper manipulation or 
destruction [7][8].  Finally availability refers to the ability to access data in a timely and 
reliable manner for authorized use [7][8]. 
2.3. Insider Threat 
 While insider threats pose a risk to both commercial and government 
organizations, the impact of such breaches in security on the military or government side 
could be more damaging due to possible impacts in national security and foreign 
relations.  A prime example is the CIA espionage case involving Robert Hanssen, in 
which he sold secret information to the USSR for over 20 years, made over 1.4 million 
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dollars, and compromised at least two intelligence sources resulting in their execution [9].  
In response to this high impact-low probability problem, security professionals need to 
proactively seek ways to combat these attacks.  The issues concerning this dilemma are 
the fact that the perpetrators are trusted members of the organization and determining the 
difference between premeditated or deliberate infractions and non-malicious or accidental 
incidents. 
2.3.1. Definition of Insider Threat  
Given such an example, the intuitive notion of what an insider and insider threat 
means is obvious.  But a more detailed meaning that provides scope and definition is 
required.  Table 2.1 [13] gives a variety of insider definitions proposed and used by 
various entities within the US Government.  Several different sources have defined these 
terms and all seem to have a common factor of trust and violation of that trust [10][11] 
[12][13].   
Despite the variations on a common theme, Matt Bishop‟s definition of insider 
threat seems to be the most succinct.  An insider is “a trusted entity that is given the 
power to violate one or more rules in a given security policy” and, “the insider threat 
occurs when a trusted entity abuses that power” [10]. 
This definition also differentiates between the honest mistake of an authorized 
user and the actions of a malicious user by the use of the keyword of “abuses.”  This 
important distinction follows that authorized users may make unintentional mistakes that 
can typically be mitigated by properly defined security policies and education.  The 
malicious user, however, requires some sort of security mechanism for detection, whether 
it is technological and/or procedural in nature [2]. 
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Table 2.1.  Insider Definitions. 
Definition Source 
A knowledgeable and trusted individual who has been 
granted access to classified information or sensitive 
facilities. 
DOE. Annual Report to the President.1987. 
A person under the statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
authority of the Department of Defense, or any other person 
who has been granted access to DoD resources, which 
include but are not limited to systems, networks, 
information, facilities, and operations. 
DoD. DoD Insider Threat Implementation 
Plan, 27 September 2007. 
[A person] trusted with legitimate access rights to enterprise 
information systems and networks. Such trusted individuals 
can pose a significant threat to the enterprise and beyond. 
President’s National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace, February 2003. 
A person who is allowed inside the security perimeter of a 
system and consequently has some privileges not granted 
outsiders. 
“Cyber-Security and the Insider Threat to 
Classified Information,” Computer Science 
and Telecommunications Board, National 
Research Council, 2000. 
A person who is regarded, falsely, as loyally working for or 
on behalf of the organization, or who inadvertently commits 
security breaches. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Broad Area Announcement 07-09, “Cyber 
Security Research and Development.” 17 
May 2007. 
Anyone with access, privilege, or knowledge of information 
systems and services. 
The MITRE Corporation. “Understanding the 
Insider Threat.” Advanced Research and 
Development Activity (ARDA) Workshop 
Presentation, March 2004. 
Anyone who is or has been authorized access to a DoD 
information system, whether a military member, a DoD 
civilian employee, or employee of another Federal agency 
or the private sector. 
DoD. “DoD Insider Threat Mitigation: Final 
Report of the Insider Threat Integrated 
Process Team.” 24 April 2000. 
Individuals who were, or previously had been, authorized to 
use the information systems they eventually employed to 
perpetrate harm. 
USSS and CMU SEI CERT/CC. “Insider 
Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in Banking 
and Finance Sector.” August 2004. 
Range of definition includes incompetent users making 
critical mistakes to moles who have been recruited, trained, 
and planted by nefarious outsiders 
National Research Council Computer 
Science and Telecommunications Board. 
“Cyber-Security and the Insider Threat to 
Classified Information.” 2000. 
Assigned personnel (military or civilian), host-country 
nationals (military or civilian), third country nationals 
(contract employees) or other persons assigned to or 
transiting the area of interest 
US Air Force. Force Protection. Air Force 
Doctrine Document 2-4.1, 29 October 1999. 
 
2.3.2. Insider Threat Trends 
Recent studies of cybercrime summarize the threat insider present to both the 
commercial and government sector.  In the 2007 E-Crime Watch Survey conducted by 
CSO Magazine with Carnegie Mellon‟s CERT, insiders were the cause of 31% of the 
reported incidents in which a perpetrator could be identified and 49% of all respondents 
reported at least one malicious insider event [14].  Although the proportion of insider 
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threat events has remained proportionately stable (27% in 2006), the IT security budgets 
have decreased by 5% and corporate security spending has been reduced by 15% [14] 
[15].  The 2009 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey showed that 43.2% of 
respondents reported a financial loss of some sort due to malicious insiders, while 
financial loss itself increased 15% from 2005 [16]. 
The reported losses do not necessarily comprise the total damage caused by 
insiders.  Naturally the loss of reputation or negative publicity can also cause intangible 
losses that may reflect in future gains or losses by an organization.  In fact, such 
perceptions may produce reluctance to voluntarily release negative information.  Such 
reasoning is why CERT believes that insider events may be under reported in the E-
Crime Watch Surveys [17].  Such concerns have been related to the top levels of 
government in an ever growing concern with insider threat [18]. 
2.3.3. Insider Threat Characteristics 
Detection and mitigation of insider threat is a difficult challenge, but the potential 
benefit in avoiding a loss of major consequence justifies further research and 
development.  For example, an insider stealing blueprints containing trade secrets worth 
$100 million, and selling them to a competitor to obtain a new job demonstrates the 
possible impact insider threat poses [11]. 
Insider attacks may be motivated by a range of factors, such as greed, revenge, 
espionage, and such issues or problems may also be exacerbated by factors outside the 
workplace.  Coupling these factors with the fact that insiders are already within the 
organization and have some authorized us of the IT systems makes them well-placed to 
misuse a system if the inclination occurs [2].  The insider‟s knowledge of the system(s) 
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involved puts them in a better position to know what is of value, know system 
vulnerabilities, and hide evidence of their activities.  Therefore, their ability to commit 
and conceal malicious activities is often better than that of outsiders. 
The insider threat study released in 2008 by Carnegie Mellon discovered that 
insiders did not share common demographic characteristics and the attacks required 
limited technical characteristics [17].   The insider threat studies conducted by Carnegie 
Mellon‟s CERT and the US Secret Services NTAC into various industry sectors shows a 
wide range of technical abilities needed in the various attack cases.  For example in the 
information technology and telecommunication sector 63% of the insiders held technical 
positions and 58% of those cases used sophisticated tools, while in the finance sector 
only 23% of the insiders held technical positions and 87% of the attacks required simple, 
legitimate user commands [17][19]. 
2.3.4. Insider Threat Attacks and Methods 
 A computer system user typically falls into one of three categories [1][2]:  
 Authorized/Normal Users – individuals that use IT resources appropriately and in 
accordance with defined policies 
 Unauthorized Malicious Users 
o Masqueraders – individuals that mask their identity to compromise the 
security system 
o Clandestine users – individuals that try to evade access controls and 
auditing measures 
 Misfeasors/Authorized and Dangerous Users – individuals authorized to use the 
system and intentionally violate their trust to perform some malicious act 
 
Authorized users may make unintentional mistakes, but these can typically be 
mitigated by properly defined security policies and education.  The malicious user 
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requires some sort of security mechanism for detection, whether it is technological and/or 
procedural in nature [2]. 
The numerous possible attacks perpetrated by malicious insiders tend to fall into 
four categories: IT sabotage, theft or modification for financial gain, theft or modification 
for business advantage, and miscellaneous [11].  Figure 2.1 [11] shows the breakdown of 
190 insider threat attacks, contained in CERT‟s case files, into four categories. 
 
Figure 2.1.  Breakdown of Insider Threat Cases. 
One should note that some cases fell into multiple categories. For example, an 
insider may have committed IT sabotage and then attempted to extort money by offering 
to assist them in recovery effort.  In such a situation the case is categorized as both IT 
sabotage and theft or modification of information for financial gain. Five of the 190 cases 
were classified in multiple categories. The overlap of categories is shown in Figure 2.2 
[11]. 
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Figure 2.2.  Overlap of Insider Threat Cases. 
The cases of IT sabotage typically were carried out by insiders who held highly 
technical positions and used sophisticated technical means to carry out their attacks.  
Thirty percent of the insiders used their own username and password, while another 43% 
compromised an account. Technical means commonly used script or program writing, 
creating a backdoor account for later use, planting a virus, using password crackers, and 
installation of remote system administration tools [11]. 
The remaining two categories referenced in Figure 2.2, showed that the method of 
attack was abusing authorized permissions in a majority of cases (75% - Financial Gain, 
88% - Business Advantage).  And when stealing data for financial gain, 85% of the 
insiders used their own usernames and passwords [11]. 
2.3.5. Issues in Identifying Possible Insider Threats 
These studies reinforce the fact that identifying possible insider attacks is 
difficult.  A majority of the attackers used legitimate access and authorized system 
commands to conduct their attacks.  The issues concerning this dilemma are the fact that 
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the perpetrators are trusted members of the organization and determining the difference 
between premeditated or deliberate infractions and non-malicious or accidental incidents 
is difficult and time consuming. 
While organizations recognize that insider threat is important and must be dealt 
with to mitigate possible damages from attacks, the major emphasis for protection is at 
the procedural and policy level with rather little emphasis on possible technical means to 
assist in mitigating insider threat [14]. 
Insiders have a significant advantage in harming an organization. Insiders can 
bypass security measures, physical and technical, installed to prevent unauthorized 
access. Technological measure such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems are used 
to mainly defend against external threats. In addition, they have knowledge of policies, 
procedures, and technologies used in their organizations, and are often also 
knowledgeable about vulnerabilities [11]. 
Given the fact that most insider attack perpetrators were identified by analyzing 
various system logs on the system [11], it stands to reason that creating a comprehensive 
approach to designing a template to detect potentially harmful behavior using audit and 
system logs is a viable method for insider threat mitigation and detection. 
2.4 Risk Management 
The implementation of security controls via auditing is dependent upon an 
information security policy that involves the management of risk.  Understanding and 
utilizing risk management is the foundation for an effective information security policy 
and provides an effective method for selecting appropriate security controls for an 
information system.  
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The DOD defines risk as the probability of loss or damage and is a function of 
three variables: criticality, vulnerability and threat [20].  Risk management is a process 
that allows organizations to balance the costs of protective measures and achieve gains in 
capability by protecting information systems and data that support the organization. To 
do this, risk management encompasses three processes: risk assessment, risk mitigation, 
and evaluation and assessment [21].   
Risk assessment is the first process in the risk management methodology 
proposed by NIST. It provides a means to identify threats that pose a risk to system 
security.  It allows one to identify the risks to system security and determining probability 
of occurrence, resulting impact, and additional impact mitigation measures [21].  This 
assessment can be accomplished quantitatively, qualitatively or via a combination of the 
two to prioritize and determine what critical data needs to be protected.  Assessing risks 
to critical data enable an organization to identify and reduce those risks to an acceptable 
level.  The NIST risk assessment methodology flowchart is provided in appendix B. 
Key components of a risk assessment model are threats and vulnerabilities. It is 
theoretically possible to have vulnerability with no threat, but threats inherently exist for 
critical data residing within information systems and make vulnerability the true key to 
the risk assessment process.     
After conducting a risk assessment, an organization would continue into the 
second process of risk management, risk mitigation. This process consists of prioritizing, 
evaluating, and implementing appropriate risk-reducing controls recommended from the 
risk assessment process.  Although theoretically possible, the elimination of all risk is 
normally impractical or nigh impossible, it is the responsibility of organization managers 
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to use the least-cost approach and implement the most appropriate controls to decrease 
mission risk to an acceptable level.  This is normally done by implementing one of six 
commonly used mitigation strategies for each vulnerability listed in Table 2.2 [21].  Once 
vulnerabilities are assessed, analyzing potential impacts will assist organizations in 
determining which risk mitigation strategy is most appropriate. 
Table 2.2.  Risk Mitigation Strategies. 
Risk Assumption 
“To accept the potential risk and continue operating 
the IT system or to implement controls to lower the 
risk to an acceptable level.” 
Risk Avoidance 
“To avoid the risk by eliminating the risk cause 
and/or consequence (e.g., forgo certain functions of 
the system or shut down the system when risks are 
identified).” 
Risk Transference 
To transfer the risk by using other options to 
compensate for the loss, such as purchasing 
insurance.” 
Risk Limitation 
“To limit the risk by implementing controls that 
minimize the adverse impact of a threats exercising 
vulnerability (e.g., use of supporting, preventive, 
detective controls).” 
Risk Planning 
“To manage risk by developing a risk mitigation plan 
that prioritizes, implements, and maintains controls.” 
Research and Development 
“Research and Acknowledgment. To lower the risk 
of loss by acknowledging the vulnerability or flaw 
and researching controls to correct the vulnerability.” 
 
The methodology of selecting a risk mitigation strategy is outlined in appendix C.   
In many organizations, periodic evaluation and assessment is most often the most 
overlooked process despite it being the third process in an effective risk management 
policy.  An organization‟s information system will most likely continue to expand along 
with periodic updates, its components change, and its software applications replaced or 
updated with newer versions. These changes mean that new risks will surface and risks 
previously mitigated may again become a concern. Thus, the risk management process is 
ongoing and evolving and requires the third process of periodic evaluation and 
assessment of its risk management strategy. 
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2.5. Auditing 
Although this research supposes that system auditing or monitoring is a viable 
method to detect insider threat, the basics of auditing and its capabilities must be 
understood. Insider threat detection is a difficult problem, but insider threat behavior can 
create a number of observables that can be detected by auditing.  The 2004 RAND 
workshop developed a taxonomy of such observables (shown in Figure 2.3 [22]) to 
recognize insider threat characteristics.  A majority of these observables were categorized 
as cyber actions which by their nature are auditable events on a computer system.  
 
Figure 2.3.  Taxonomy of Observables. 
2.5.1. What is Auditing? 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines auditing and 
monitoring in the following way [23]: 
To maintain operational assurance, organizations use two 
basic methods: system audits and monitoring. These terms 
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are used loosely within the computer security community 
and often overlap. A system audit is a one-time or periodic 
event to evaluate security. Monitoring refers to an ongoing 
activity that examines either the system or the users. In 
general, the more "real-time" an activity is, the more it 
falls into the category of monitoring. 
 
In addition, NIST also differentiates between auditing and audit trails by defining 
auditing as the action taken to “review and analysis of management, operational, and 
technical controls”, while audit trails are the “series of records of computer events, about 
an operating system, an application, or user activities” [24].  Needless to say audit trails 
are typically stored in system log files and can provide detailed information on the 
operation and actions taken on a computer system. 
Auditing is mandated as one of the minimum security requirements for federal 
information and information systems to allow the “monitoring, analysis, investigation, 
and reporting of unlawful, unauthorized, or inappropriate information system activity” 
while ensuring actions of individual system users can be traced to those users for 
accountability [25]. 
The Software Engineering Institute includes auditing, logging, and monitoring as 
a best practice in detecting and preventing insider threats [11].  All three actions can help 
an organization to discover and investigate suspicious insider actions more quickly 
thereby lessening any possible damages.  Auditing should involve the review and 
verification of changes to any of the organization‟s critical information assets.   
2.5.2. Auditing Policy 
The purpose of an auditing policy is to help protect an organization's information 
system. Through the selection and application of well-chosen auditing rules and 
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procedures, auditing can help by protecting resources, reputation, legal position, and 
other tangible or intangible assets.  To create a well-developed audit policy, an 
organization needs to understand how each information system supports their mission. 
After a system's role has been defined, the security requirements implicit in that role can 
be defined and be explicitly stated to define how auditing integrates into the 
organization‟s security policy. 
Since computer systems are ever-changing, system security is more of an ongoing 
process than a static situation.  Periodic reassessments of auditing policies are necessary 
and should ensure applicable laws and regulations are maintained.  The audit policy 
should also describe how the system is audited, what activities should be identified, and 
how particular anomalies may be recognized.  Also general log management functions 
need to be determined and outlined.  For example, who will review the audit logs, how 
often they are reviewed, storage requirements, and incident handling. 
A disconcerting trend is that many organizations fail to follow through in their 
policies by failing to have incident response plans.  The 2007 study by Carnegie Mellon‟s 
CERT Coordination Center and CSO Magazine revealed that 48% of respondents had no 
formal incident handling plan, while 62% of the e-crimes were not prosecuted due to a 
lack of sufficient evidence or inability to identify the perpetrator.  This is especially 
disconcerting since 74% of the insider attacks used either their own account or a 
compromised account [14].  Without such a plan delineating reporting and response 
procedures, an organization may have difficulty in determining if a security breach has 
even occurred.  
  
20 
 
2.5.3. The Current Role of Auditing 
An organization‟s audit policy determines the security events to record.  
Organizations can monitor security-related activity and these audited events are 
instrumental in identifying an insider event.  Failing to monitor key activities can hinder 
the ability to identify insider threat.  While auditing is a necessary control measure, 
capturing excessive amounts of events will fill audit logs with trivial events and hinder 
the filtering process.  An organization must find a balance between capturing as many 
events as necessary to meet their security needs and usability and practical monitoring 
limitations of the system.  In addition, monetary costs of auditing must be balanced with 
the perceived benefit of such security measures.  Such issues as storage space, processing 
power, and investigations of suspicious activity can play an important factor in how much 
an organization wishes to invest into auditing for insider threat. 
2.5.3.1. Individual Accountability 
As a technical mechanism, audit trails help managers maintain individual 
accountability.  Proper user behavior can be promoted by advising them that they are 
tracked by an audit policy that logs user activities and therefore personally accountable 
for their actions.
 
 The likelihood of users circumventing security policy decreases if they 
know their actions are audited.  Audit trails can work with logical access controls to 
restrict use of system resources and even detect improper data modifications.  Such data 
modifications could be determined by comparing actual changes of data and expected 
changes.  This can help determine if errors were made by the user, the system/application 
software, or some other source.  Audit trail analysis is useful in examining user actions to 
ensure users are not abusing their legitimate access nor gaining unauthorized access to 
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resources. An example would be a user that has access to personnel records and is 
printing records exceeding the average user; this could indicate authorized access abuse 
for financial gain [24]. 
A RAND study conducted to understand the insider threat within the US 
Intelligence Community developed an attack model, detailed in Figure 2.4 [22], that a 
malicious insider would follow.  This the risk analysis step in this deliberate decision 
making process would allow the attacker to assess the risk of detection prior to 
committing the attack.  With a strong audit policy in place, the insider would expect the 
detection risk as high and possibly decide to stop the attack.  This is how auditing could 
serve as a deterrent to malicious insider activity. 
 
Figure 2.4.  Spiral Model Flowchart. 
Auditing can also be a benefit in identifying individuals more likely to perform an 
insider attack.  A study in system dynamics on the insider threat problem described the 
relationship between the perceived risk of an insider, monitoring, and the discovery of 
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precursor activity [26].  This relationship is depicted in Figure 2.5 [26].  These precursor 
activities would allow an organization to pinpoint individuals at a higher risk of insider 
activity and implement a targeted investigation or monitoring if necessary. 
 
Figure 2.5.  Targeted Monitoring. 
2.5.3.2. Reconstruction of Events 
Audit trails or logs can be used to reconstruct events.  This is typically done after 
the detection of abnormal activity, errors, or anomalous activity, which may present 
threats to an organization.   Such situations can be assessed by examining a systems audit 
trail and help determine whether an error is operator induced or system-based.  Step-by-
step recreation of events courtesy of an audit trail or log represents a beneficial tool for an 
organization‟s system administrators.  Such records can also aid in the recovery of 
corrupted data files if transaction-based events are recorded [24]. 
2.5.3.3. Intrusion Detection 
Intrusions can be detected in real or near real time, by examining audit records.  
Such logs can be examined as they are created or after the fact.  While real-time intrusion 
detection is used primarily to detect outside attacks, it may also be used to detect changes 
in the system's performance indicative of such things as a worm or virus attack [24].  
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Real-time detection methods must be balanced with system usability as such processes 
could hamper system performance.  Post-mortem identification can be used to identify 
and assess unauthorized access attempts and whether they were successful.  Such 
identifications in either real-time or after the fact allows an organization to mitigate any 
damage occurred; the organization can also review and revise its control mechanisms. 
Intrusion detection systems may also be used to automatically report attempts to 
compromise a system and identify and block information gathering attempts by an 
attacker.  Such reports on attempted attacks would allow an organization to initiate 
incident response actions to minimize possible damage caused by the incident.  The IDS 
may log information that could be used by the incident handlers.  In addition, IDSs can be 
configured to report security policy violations and monitor file transfers to identify 
suspicious activity, such as copying large files [27].  In identifying reconnaissance 
activity, it is possible for an IDS to block reconnaissance attempts and notify appropriate 
personnel for actions, if needed, to modify security policy controls to prevent system 
compromises. 
2.5.3.4. Problem Analysis 
Audit trails may also be used in conjunction with performance monitoring tools to 
help identify problems. Often referred to as real-time auditing or monitoring, it may be 
implemented to monitor the status of critical processes and used as verification that a 
system is operating normally [24].  Such use could be used to detect significant increase 
in the use of system resources which might indicate a security problem. 
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2.6. Related Research 
This research combines the efforts of prior studies into insider threat vulnerability 
assessment processes and auditing template creation, in order to develop a more rigorous 
and methodical process to create insider threat  auditing templates.  This section provides 
an overview into these previous studies. 
 King‟s [3] Malicious Insider Composite Vulnerability Threat Assessment 
methodology provides a process to identify such threats in an organization.  Before 
determining the viability of auditing as an insider threat countermeasure, one must 
identify the threats and understand an insider‟s intentions and actions.  King identified 
these threats by using the Cyber Observable and Attack Models [22] and extending the 
Insider Threat Functional Decomposition Model (ITFDM) [4].  The ITFDM study 
described approaches for identifying and classifying the more prevalent insider threat.  
King used this research and a multi-dimensional approach: content analysis, attack tree 
framework, and an intent driven taxonomy model to develop a malicious insider Decision 
Support System (DSS) tool. This study provided an assessment of an insider threat‟s 
vulnerability levels based upon aggregated vulnerability assessment and impact 
assessment levels [3]. 
This research uses King‟s methodology to allow an organization to identify 
possible insider threat risks and test the ability of Linux auditing to detect such threats as 
posited by Levoy [5] within a computer system.  Levoy‟s work studied the efficient 
auditing settings on a Windows operating system to create a customized security template 
to detect insider threat using a systems inherent auditing capabilities [43].  Specifically, 
exploring what can be done within an organization using existing workstation auditing 
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tools to identify potential insider threats.  His research studied what configuration of 
auditing on individual workstation can better identify behavior associated with malicious 
insider activity.  This research applies the same concepts to the Linux operating system 
while using King‟s research to develop use cases or risks associated with a notional 
example. 
2.7. Linux Logging and Auditing 
In order to understand the methodology presented in this thesis, the current types 
of auditing being used, the auditing categories, and how they function within a Linux 
operating system must first be understood.   
2.7.1. Auditing Overview 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the most 
common types of security-related operating system data are system events and audit 
records [28].  
System events are actions performed by operating system components.  Many 
operating systems permit administrators to specify which events are logged, but failed 
events and the more significant successful events are the more commonly logged events. 
The details logged for each event can vary, but each event is usually time-stamped.  
Other information in the log events can include status, error codes, service name, and 
user or system account information for each event.  
Audit records contain security event information for a system.  Such information 
can include successful and failed authentication attempts, file accesses, security policy 
changes, account changes, and use of privileges. As with system events, operating 
systems typically permit system administrators to specify which types of events should be 
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audited and whether successful and/or failed attempts on various system actions can be 
logged.  
Operating system logs may also contain information from other software and 
applications running on the system.  System logs are useful for identifying and 
investigating suspicious activity on a particular system.  System logs are often analyzed 
to compile information on suspicious activity. For example, in the 2009 CERT guide: 
Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats 3rd Edition, the 
majority of insider threat participants were identified via system logging [11]. 
System logging on the Linux operating system originates with its derivation of the 
Unix operating system and its applicable function of the same name.  The necessity for 
such a logging system became a necessity as operating systems and applications grew 
more complex.  Systems were devised to categorize and log the multitude of messages 
and allow the operations staff to quickly analyze problems from simple status messages.   
2.7.2. Syslog 
The BSD Syslog Protocol is one such system that has been widely accepted in 
many operating systems [29].  Flexibility was designed into this process so administrators 
have the ability to configure the destination of messages sent from the processes running 
on the device.  Events received by the syslog process can be logged to different files and 
also displayed on the console of the device, as well as forward the messages across a 
network to another syslog process on a different machine.  
Basically, the syslog protocol provides a transport to allow a machine to send 
event messages across IP networks to syslog servers, normally over a UDP connection 
[29].  The protocol is only designed to transport the event messages and does not address 
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security or integrity of the message transmission.  Using syslog, a remote host can keep 
track of the general well being of any other host running the syslog protocol.  In an 
enterprise system using the syslog protocol, each message generator uses a common 
high-level format for its logs and the same basic mechanism for transferring its log 
entries to a syslog server running on another host [28].  Any operating system or 
application can use syslog as it provides a simple framework for message entry 
generation, storage, and transfer if designed properly. Many applications and operating 
systems either use syslog as their native logging format or offer features that allow their 
log formats to be converted to syslog format, such as Microsoft Windows and Cisco 
operating systems.   An example of syslog output can be seen below in Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6.  Sample Syslog Output. 
Syslog assigns a priority to each message based on two attributes, the message 
type or facility and its severity level.  The facility attribute is composed of 24 facility 
(typically only 18 are used) types ranging from kernel messages to eight locally defined 
categories.  Other facility types are mail system messages, authorization messages, 
printer messages, and audit messages.  Severity levels are divided into eight categories 
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ranging from emergency, where the system is unusable, to debug-level messages [29].  
The facilities and severity levels can be seen in Table 2.3 [29]. 
Table 2.3.  Syslog Facility and Severity Levels. 
Facility Message Description 
kern Kernel messages 
user User-level messages 
mail Mail system 
daemon System daemons 
auth Authorization system: general security events 
syslog Syslogd messages 
lpr Line printer system 
news News subsystem 
uccp UUCP system. 
cron Clock daemon 
Authpriv Security/authorization messages: access-control related messages 
ftp FTP daemon 
Ntp NTP subsystem 
local0-7 Locally defined categories 
mark Generated by syslog itself for timestamping logs. 
  
Severity Description 
emerg Emergency: System is unusable 
alert Alert: Action must be taken immediately 
crit Critical: Critical conditions 
err Error: Error conditions   
warning Warning: Warning conditions  
notice Notice: Normal but significant condition 
info Informational: Informational messages 
debug Debug: Messages for debugging purposes 
 
 Syslog can be configured to handle log entries based on each message‟s facility 
and severity. For example, it could forward emergency-level (0) kernel messages to a log 
server for further analysis, and record all debug-level (7) messages without forwarding 
them. This is the extent of the protocol‟s message handling capability, as it cannot make 
decisions based on the source or content of a message [28].  
Syslog was designed to be very simple with a three-section format for messages. 
The first section specifies the facility and severity as numerical values, commonly called 
the priority value. The second section of a syslog message is a timestamp and the 
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hostname or IP address of the message source. The final section is the actual message 
content as defined by the generator of the message, since no standard fields are defined 
within the message content.  The messages are intended to be human-readable, and 
therefore not easily machine-readable. This simple design provides flexibility for log 
generators, which allows whatever information deemed important to be placed in the 
content field [29]. 
Given that syslog messages were designed to be human-readable, the sheer 
number of messages generated in systems today is nearly impossible to analyze 
manually.  To increase analysis efficiency, log parsing tools have been developed to aid 
administrators.  Regex scripting and perl scripting are two such examples along with 
other log parsing programs developed by various third-party entities. 
2.7.3. Rsyslog 
Rsyslog is a general public licensed, enhanced version of the syslog protocol. It 
supports all the functionality and settings of syslog, but also offers support for reliable 
syslog over TCP, writing to MySQL databases and fully configurable output formats 
including timestamps. Rsyslog was initiated by Rainer Gerhards.   In 2004, rsyslog was 
split from the sysklogd development team with the goal to provide a more feature-rich 
and secure syslog daemon while retaining drop-in replacement capabilities to stock 
syslogd implementations. Rsyslog is more secure by natively supporting reliable 
transmission modes like TCP or RFC 3195 (syslog-reliable) [30]. 
The rsyslog daemon supports an enhanced syslog configuration file format, and 
also works with the standard syslog configuration file. It is possible to simply replace the 
syslogd binary with the one that comes with rsyslog, although modifications to the 
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configuration file would be required to use the newer features of rsyslog over syslog.  
Rsyslog was released in February 2007 and development is still continuing.  As of today, 
rsyslog is the default implementation of system logging in two of the more popular Linux 
distributions, Fedora and Ubuntu, as of versions 8 and 9.10 respectively. 
2.7.4. Audit Subsystem 
At the system level, auditing refers to the logging of the actions of users and 
programs of a system. The Linux Audit daemon performs the latter form of auditing. As a 
passive security measure it only detects, not enforce violations of security policy.  
Because the kernel provides the lowest-level access to system resources, every 
application must make a system call, either directly or indirectly, the audit daemon is 
capable of monitoring all system calls made to the kernel. Additionally, the audit daemon 
integrates with Security-Enhanced Linux (SE-Linux) and can log violations of SE-Linux 
policy [31]. 
Linux auditing helps secure a system by providing a means to analyze system 
actions in great detail. Audit subsystem consists of several components contributing to 
the functionality of the overall framework. The audit kernel module intercepts the system 
calls and records the relevant events. The auditd daemon writes the audit reports to disk. 
Various command line utilities take care of displaying, querying, and archiving the audit 
trail [32].  Figure 2.7 shows a sample audit record and Figure 2.8 [32] shows the 
components involved in the Linux Audit Subsystem. 
The audit subsystem is comprised of seven components in a Linux distribution. 
The audit daemon (auditd) writes the audit messages to disk that are generated via the 
audit kernel interface, which are triggered by application and system activity. The audit 
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daemon is started and controlled by its configuration file, normally located at 
/etc/sysconfig/auditd.  The audit functions are controlled by /etc/auditd.conf once the 
daemon is started. 
The auditctl utility controls the audit system. Log generation parameters, kernel 
settings of the audit interface, and rule sets that determine which events are tracked are 
controlled by this utility.   The file /etc/audit.rules contains a list of auditctl commands 
that are loaded at system boot time immediately after the audit daemon is started.  These 
rules are what allow an administrator to custom tailor what events the subsystem may 
monitor. 
The aureport utility provides the capability to create custom reports from the audit 
event log. This report generation can be scripted and the output used by other 
applications.  The ausearch utility provides the ability to search the audit log file for 
certain events using characteristics of the logged format or keywords provided in the 
audit rules.  The audit dispatcher daemon (audispd) allows the subsystem to relay event 
notifications to other applications instead of or in addition to writing them to disk in the 
audit log if necessary.  The autrace utility can trace individual processes and is similar to 
strace. The output of autrace is logged to the audit log. [32] 
 
Figure 2.7.  Sample Audit Log Entry. 
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Figure 2.8.  Linux Audit System Components. 
The audit subsystem traces processes to the user ID that started them. This allows 
an administrator to trace which user owns which process and determine who is 
potentially performing malicious operations. The Linux audit subsystem also provides 
tools that write the audit reports to disk and translate them into human readable format.  
Linux auditing provides the capability to filter the audit reports for certain events of 
interest, by filtering on the following data: 
 
 User 
 Group 
 Audit ID 
 Remote Hostname 
 Remote Host Address 
 System Call 
 System Call Arguments 
 File 
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 File Operations 
 Success or Failure 
Linux auditing provides the means to filter the audit reports for events of interest 
and to record selected events. It allows the creation of customized rule sets to direct the 
audit daemon to record events of interest.  In the subsystem, audit reports are owned by 
root and unauthorized users cannot remove the audit logs.  If an audit event cannot be 
recorded, the audit subsystem can trigger a shutdown of the system to keep events from 
escaping its control. Since this shutdown would be an immediate halt of the system 
without any syncing of the latest logs to disk, the default configuration for this capability 
is to log a warning to syslog rather than to halt the system.  The subsystem allows a clean 
shutdown, if the system runs out of disk space when logging, but the default 
configuration is to stop logging when there is no more disk space. [32] 
2.8. Summary 
This chapter has covered the necessary background for this research study.  The 
objectives for maintaining information security and insider threat trends, characteristics, 
and types have been covered.  The basics of what auditing is and its current uses and risk 
management basics were also described.  Finally the types of logging and auditing in a 
Linux operating system were described at an overview level. 
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III. Methodology 
This chapter outlines the methodology used to develop use cases based on a risk 
assessment methodology and create a customized auditing policy for a Linux 
workstation.  The problem definition and research goals are presented and followed by 
taxonomy of insider threat and an associated risk assessment process.  The chapter 
finishes with how an organization would customize the system logging and auditing rule 
sets for a Linux workstation. 
3.1. Problem Definition 
While most system security tools deal with outside attacks, organizations have 
recognized the importance of insider threat.  To help detect and mitigate such attacks 
organizations may implement specialized tools, take advantage of available resources, or 
ignore such risks.  Organizations may use the existing auditing capabilities to provide a 
layer of defense to the insider threat without ignoring the risks or purchasing costly 
proprietary solutions.  Although the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) does 
offer a Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG) for Unix operating systems that 
delineates some auditing rules, its main purpose is for general system security with no 
specific objective to monitor possible insider threat [33].  This does not address an 
organization‟s unique security risks and vulnerabilities, especially if such an organization 
utilizes a Linux distribution other than RHEL5.  Rather than rely on a general 
workstation auditing configuration, an organization should know exactly what events its 
workstations need to audit based on the organization‟s computer security requirements 
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and priorities. Currently there exists no defined methodology for creating a customized 
Linux auditing template based on organizational security requirements and priorities. 
3.1.1. Research Goals 
The main goal of this research is to establish a methodology for developing an 
organization-specific auditing configuration for a Linux workstation to detect insider 
threat.  This research should delineate the need for effective risk assessment based on an 
organization‟s needs and priorities to determine use cases that will help create a tailored 
auditing configuration based on an organization‟s security requirements and risk 
assessment.  This research uses the existing system logging and auditing capabilities of a 
Linux workstation and tailors it to detect activities associated with malicious insider 
behavior. 
3.1.2. Expected Outcome 
It is expected that once the proof-of-concept method is developed, organizations 
will be able to more effectively and efficiently detect possible insider threat activity. In 
turn, this should allow organizations to allocate scarce security resources to more 
effectively mitigate insider threat risks. 
3.2. Approach 
An evaluation of the auditing and logging capabilities available for configuration 
in Linux is performed to determine whether insider threat scenarios developed by a risk 
assessment methodology can be detected. A series of 24 malicious insider scenarios or 
use cases, developed from risks determined by King‟s extended ITFDM, are simulated 
and the logs resulting from these activities are analyzed.  The end result is a customized 
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auditing and logging configuration based on an organizations perceived threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
3.3. Extended ITFDM 
King‟s vulnerability assessment methodology starts by performing a content 
analysis of existing insider threat research, case studies, and surveys.  This analysis 
provided a way to determine the more prevalent actions performed by insider threats. The 
methodology includes analysis of a variety of sources to determine insider threat 
commonalties.  The analysis of a number of recent sources to create a more 
comprehensive list of various actions and is a key component of this methodology. 
Insider threat actions identified in the content analysis phase were categorized 
according to possible insider threat intentions and resulted in a more comprehensive 
intent-based ITFDM (Insider Thread Functional Decomposition Model).  This extended 
model listed each applicable action under the various intentions. 
Before determining insider threat intentions, the insider threat actions identified in 
the content analysis are categorized into the four states in the ITFDM (Figure 3.1) [3].  
Each insider threat action is analyzed and re-classified to determine the insider‟s primary 
intent.  After identifying the intention of each action, those sharing similar intentions are 
grouped together. 
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Figure 3.1.  Root and 1st Tier ITFDM Action Leaf Nodes. 
Figure 3.2 [3] shows the sixteen insider threat intentions identified in King‟s research. 
Figures D.1-D.4, map each action to the insider threat‟s applicable intention from King‟s 
research (located in Appendix D [3]). 
 
Figure 3.2.  ITFDM Malicious Intentions. 
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King proposes a periodic update of the intent-based ITFDM annually to preserve 
the utility of the extended model to ensure it contains current vulnerabilities.  Classifying 
insider actions based upon primary intention allows organizations to focus on their 
primary areas of concern and associated actions. Depending on an organization‟s 
requirements and priorities, some intentions and associated actions are more applicable 
than others.  King‟s extended ITFDM allows organizations to focus on specific insider 
threat intentions of concern and actions commonly used to exploit those intentions. 
3.4. Insider Threat Use Case Detection Verification 
The System Under Test (SUT) in this study is the Linux auditing subsystem and 
logging subsystem running inside a virtual computer, using VMWare Workstation. It is a 
basic installation of Ubuntu version 9.10 with all security patches as of 23 November 
2009. The SUT includes adjustable auditing and logging configurations that collectively 
make up the Component Under Study (CUS).  
The input for the SUT is the group of 24 insider threat use cases. All scenarios are 
manually executed through the SUT, one at a time while the CUS audits or logs for 
success and failure. The Linux subsystems tested recording of detectable events in the 
audit log or appropriate syslog file for each subsystem respectively. After each test run is 
complete, the virtual machine is reset to the baseline configuration. This is accomplished 
using a VMWare snapshot. 
The scope of the study is limited to a single workstation operating in VMWare 
without network connectivity. It is designed to simulate the security implications of 
multiple users sharing a common workstation. The workstation does not include the 
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logging of network access and interaction with other workstations, servers, or peripheral 
devices. 
3.4.1. System Logging Configuration 
The parameters for the logging subsystem are the 24 facility groups and eight 
severity levels configured to output to individual files for each combination of a single 
facility and a single severity level.  For example log messages with the kernel (0) facility 
and the emergency (0) severity level would be outputted to the log file at 
/var/log/rsyslog.kernel.emerg on the Linux workstation.  This will result in 192 individual 
log files.  The rsyslog configuration will not change for each use case scenario.  All 
system log files are cleared when the SUT is reset by VMWare SnapShot before each use 
case is tested. 
3.4.2. Auditing Configuration 
The parameters for the auditing subsystem are the system call and file watch 
settings configured to audit success and failure of the pertinent system call and/or file 
described in each use case.  The auditing subsystem can track any kind of file system 
access to important files, configurations or resources. It allows the addition of watches on 
these and can assign keys to each kind of watch for better identification in the logs.  The 
system call auditing functionality allows the tracking of the system‟s behavior below the 
application level with the option of filtering auditable events with a great deal of 
granularity.  The output of each use case is moved from the /var/log/audit/audit.log 
default location to a separate file for each use case.  The audit log is then cleared when 
the SUT is reset by VMWare SnapShot before each use case is tested. 
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3.5. Data Collection 
The output of the SUT for each scenario is annotated in a Microsoft Excel® 
worksheet as a success or failure of detection and grouped by the log type (rsyslog, audit, 
or both).  The pertinent log files are saved in .txt format on the host system.  The 
associated system or audit message events key to detecting each use case are also 
annotated on the Microsoft Excel® worksheet for possible future research. 
3.6 System Setup 
The virtual machine consists of VMWare Workstation, version 6.5.3, build 
185404.  The hardware platform is an AOpen mini-PC, Model MP945-D, with a 2.20 
GHz T2450 Intel processor, and 2 GB of RAM.  The Virtual Operating System is a 
standard Ubuntu distribution, version 9.10, with all available security patches 
downloaded and installed as of 23 November 2009. 
3.7 Procedure 
Each time a use case scenario is simulated, the following steps are completed to 
ensure that the obtained samples are independent and specific to the current scenario: 
1. Load VMWare SnapShot – This resets the virtual machine to the baseline for 
each scenario ran. 
2. Configure Audit Settings – The rsyslog.conf configuration file is constant for 
every use case and does not change as the configuration allows for the capture 
of all system log messages for every facility at every severity level.  The 
audit.rules file is configured with the appropriate file watches and/or system 
call watches as determined by the use case.  The audit subsystem is then 
restarted with newly configured rule set. 
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3. Wipe Log Files – All logs (all system logs and the audit log) are cleared to 
ensure that there are not any other logged events in them. 
4. Perform Use Case – The 24 use case scenarios are manually executed using a 
checklist of exactly what is to be performed. 
5. Save Log Files – Upon completion of the use case, all logs (system logs and 
audit log) are saved as .txt files on the host system for later analysis offline. 
6. Evaluate Log Files – Upon completion of the use case scenario, the log files 
are evaluated to determine if any identifying events for the use case have been 
logged.  These key events are separated by scenario and annotated on the 
aforementioned Microsoft Excel® worksheet for further analysis. 
3.8. Use Case Scenarios 
A critical factor in the methodology is the selection of use case scenarios. An 
organization must select carefully to ensure a comprehensive representation of their 
insider threat security requirements. For this study, the scenarios are selected based upon 
possible requirements of a typical organization using the King‟s extended ITFD model. 
The 24 use cases are general examples of possible scenarios an organization might select. 
The scenarios focus on protecting the confidentiality of files on a shared workstation. The 
scenarios simulate multiple users using a common workstation, and a malicious user 
attempting to access other user‟s files. The scenarios simulate various techniques that a 
malicious insider might use to obtain access to vital information. Privileges held by 
administrators as well as normal users are represented in the scenarios. The derivation of 
these use cases is presented in the next chapter (Table 4.1). 
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3.9. Evaluation Technique 
Once the results from the use case scenarios are collected and evaluated, they are 
put into a table for ease of analysis to determine what system log settings and audit rule 
sets can identify insider threat activities for an organization based on their security 
requirements.  This table will enable an organization to determine what additional control 
measures are necessary to identify insider threat risks identified that were not detected by 
the Linux logging subsystem nor the audit subsystem. 
3.10. Summary 
The methodology and verification described in this chapter can be used to create a 
customized insider threat auditing template for a Linux workstation.  It is used to 
determine how well the Linux logging and auditing subsystems can detect particular 
insider threats, using scenarios focused on unique organizational security requirements. 
The results of a notional example are presented in the next chapter. 
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IV. Use Case Verification 
This chapter presents a notional example to demonstrate the application of the 
concepts presented in this research to include: (1) the intent-based ITFDM, (2) 
verification of insider threat detection via auditing, and (3) development of an 
organization-specific auditing and logging rule set for insider threat detection. 
4.1. Notional Example 
To demonstrate the concepts proposed in this research and understand their 
potential, a notional example is developed. A generic organization is defined to 
demonstrate the wide applicability of the methodologies without limiting them to any one 
type of organization (e.g., commercial sector or Department of Defense). 
4.1.1. Example Overview 
For the purpose of this example the organizational leadership wishes to determine 
what sort of security policy is needed to deter or detect insider threat.  The organization is 
concerned with the security of its stand-alone systems, which have no outside 
connectivity.  These systems are located in secure facilities with administration personnel 
located off-premises.  Due to the fact that administration personnel are not co-located 
with the systems in question, personnel have terminal window access to perform basic 
system administration functions at the direction of IT support personnel. 
The primary concern of the organization in regards to insider threat is the average 
employee with basic knowledge of the Linux system.  Such concerns are readily 
supported by recent insider threat studies conducted by CERT [11].  The most recent 
study found that a majority of insider threat actions were concerned with theft for 
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business or financial gain.  In 85% of theft for financial gain cases studied, the insiders 
used their own username and password and in all the cases involving theft for business 
gain none of the insiders had neither system nor database administration access [11].  
While IT sabotage is an organizational concern, the sabotage risks involved with stand-
alone systems is deemed to be acceptable by the organization. 
4.1.2. Example Problem Definition 
Suppose an organization must secure stand-alone workstations and leadership has 
requested a security policy pertaining to insider threat to complement existing security 
policy. The organization‟s objective is to assess the effectiveness of existing system 
capabilities and to obtain an analysis as to the effectiveness of such measures. 
4.2. Methodology Demonstration 
This section explains how the methodology described in chapter III would be 
conducted to provide a customized auditing policy to detect insider threat.  This 
methodology will start with creating use cases by utilizing the ITFDM discussed as a risk 
assessment methodology.  Other risk assessment methodologies may be used, but for the 
purpose of this study, King‟s intent-based ITFDM is utilized [3].  Once the use case 
scenarios have been created, the use cases are verified on a test system.  Once all the use 
cases have been tested, an analysis of such results is conducted to determine what 
scenarios can be detected and what key event messages are generated to denote 
suspicious behavior. 
4.2.1. Extended ITFDM use case scenarios 
The use case scenarios are developed using the extended ITFDM proposed by 
King.  In this method a content analysis of current research in prevalent insider threat 
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cases was performed.  Such research includes the CSI/FBI annual studies and the insider 
threat studies performed by CERT and the US Secret Service [11][14-17][19][34-41].  
Given the scope of the problem definition and organization priorities, 24 use case 
scenarios were developed for test verification.   
The categorization proposed by King allows for a more granular examination of 
insider threat risk by intention, allowing an organization to properly assess impact of 
risks determined by the content analysis, because they were developed with the 
organization‟s specific limitations in mind.  For example with the system specified as a 
stand-alone, file distribution threats would be limited to mounting external media to the 
workstation, such as a USB flash drive, and may be deemed to be a lower acceptable risk 
than an insider‟s unauthorized access to critical data.  Keeping in mind such factors 
allows an organization to properly define and assess the risk and impact of the possible 
insider attack vectors presented from the content analysis. 
4.2.2. Use Case Scenarios 
These use cases were developed by a reasoned discussion in an insider threat 
working group composed of security and IT support personnel.  This group theorized 
what actions an average user may take depending upon the intent of the malicious insider 
in addition to the content analysis of recent insider threat trends as dictated by King‟s 
methodology.  It is assumed the group will utilize previous use cases documented by 
attack trees to refine possible attack paths over time and benefit the development of new 
use cases with periodic re-evaluations of the system.  A list of the 24 use cases developed 
for this example can be seen in Table 4.1 and detailed analysis of these cases are located 
in Appendix E. 
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4.2.2.1. Gain Unauthorized System and/or Data Access 
Pertaining to an insider‟s intent to “gain unauthorized system and/or data access,” 
an insider attempting to gain root access was determined to be unlikely but very 
damaging.  Although a low probability was assessed to this risk, the possible impact to 
needed to be addressed.  Given a hypothetical situation in which a malicious insider may 
attempt to gain root access and perform unauthorized actions on critical data.  It was 
determined the most probable methods would be through the use of the su and/or sudo 
commands.  Current policy prohibits the use of the su command and requires the use of 
the sudo command for any root level actions performed by system administrators, 
therefore it was determined that any observable events denoting the use of the su 
command could be considered suspicious, while any event denoting the use of the sudo 
command would require investigation. 
While root-level access affords an insider with absolute power over a Linux 
workstation, it was determined that monitoring all root-level actions would be 
overwhelming to security and administrator personnel.  The limitations of the system 
logging and auditing functions of the Linux operating system would require monitoring 
all actions performed at the root level, since differentiating between user and automated 
kernel actions is non-existent in the operating system.  
4.2.2.2. Conceal Malicious Behavior 
In the unlikely event an insider was to gain root level access, the organization 
wanted to determine if malicious actions pertaining to system logging and auditing could 
be monitored.  Given the default restrictions on the logging and auditing systems‟ 
configurations as well as the logs, it was determined that user attempts would normally 
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be unsuccessful, but any attempt to conceal malicious behavior should tested for 
observability. 
If an insider were to operate within the organization, hiding his or her actions 
would be paramount to escape detection either as root or a normal user.  Therefore eight 
use cases were developed to determine if such actions could be observed with the logging 
and auditing subsystems.  The use cases developed to test for the reading, modification, 
or deletion of the configuration files and logs at the user, administrator, and root privilege 
levels.  A use case was also created to test if a user could be observed attempting to 
disable the logging and auditing daemons.  In addition, a seemingly benign task of 
clearing a user‟s own .bash_history file could be considered an attempt to conceal 
malicious behavior.  While such a command history file would be of little use in event 
reconstruction with its limited storage, the fact that a user would hide such behavior 
might be a behavioral indicator for insider activity. 
4.2.2.3. Take Over and/or Corrupt Computers 
  It was also determined that an insider would attempt to escalate account 
privileges to access critical information by attempting to modify system files such as the 
/etc/group or /etc/sudoers file.  Attempts to add additional system accounts by 
unauthorized personnel should be monitored as well. 
4.2.2.4. Unauthorized File Access 
 The organization leadership in this example determined that two files and the 
directories that contain them as critical information and should be monitored for 
unauthorized access.  Monitoring of critical data was to determine if unauthorized 
attempts to access the information could be observe.  Seven use case scenarios fall within 
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this category to reflect the large percentage of insider cases relating to theft discussed 
earlier in this chapter (Section 4.1.1. Example Overview).  Given that administrator level 
access did not forgo standard owner and group privileges unless root level access was 
invoked, the majority of these use cases pertain to the attempts made at the standard user 
level.  The use case results would help determine what observables are generated when a 
user attempts to access a critical file with and without group access as well as attempts to 
change directory or file attributes. 
4.2.2.5.  Unauthorized File Distribution & Destruction of Critical Data 
The last two use cases pertain to file distribution situations and destruction of 
critical data.  The first use case of the two determines if an outside storage device is 
mounted to the file system.  As the system has no outside connectivity, an external 
storage device is the only way for a file to be distributed.  The second use case 
determines if an unauthorized attempt to delete critical data can be detected.   
4.2.3. Verification Analysis and Results 
It was determined during the verification of the results that the Linux system 
logging system is not capable of monitoring file access events.  The only situations 
deemed useful for the purpose of this research was to monitor the use of the su and sudo 
commands.  The event messages generated allowed for security personnel to determine 
who attempted to initiate the commands and their success or failure in the attempt.  In the 
case of the su command, the auditing system could monitor successful attempts. But 
unsuccessful attempts in this situation are equally useful in targeting suspect individuals. 
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Table 4.1.  Insider Threat Use Cases. 
1 
User with root password attempts to use „su‟ command (Security policy disallows 
root login and the use of „su‟ command) 
2 
User without root password attempts to use „su‟ command (Security policy 
disallows root login and the use of „su‟ command) 
3 
Authorized user attempts to use „sudo‟ command without valid password (up to 3 
unsuccessful attempts) 
4 Unauthorized user attempts to use „sudo‟ command with valid password 
5 Admin\root attempts to access User directory and file 
6 Admin\root attempts to modify system logging and audit rule sets 
7 Admin\root attempts to modify system logs and audit log  
8 Admin\root attempts to clear system logs and audit log 
9 User attempts to read system logs and audit log  
10 User attempts to modify system logs and audit log 
11 User attempts to clear system logs and audit log 
12 User attempts to stop/disable rsyslog and auditing daemon 
13 User attempts to modify system log and audit rule sets 
14 User attempts to add system account 
15 
User attempts to modify user/group information 
/etc/group,passwd,gshadow,shadow,/security/opasswd 
16 User A attempts to access User B directory 
17 User A attempts to access User B file w/o group access 
18 User A attempts to access User B file w/ group access 
19 
User A attempts to modify permissions of User B directory(chgrp, chown, 
chmod) 
20 
User A attempts to change permissions of User B file w/o group access (chgrp, 
chown, chmod) 
21 
User A attempts to change permissions of User B file w/ group access (chgrp, 
chown, chmod) 
22 User attempts to mount an external USB flash drive 
23 User attempts to clear .bash-history file 
24 Unauthorized user attempts to delete a file 
 
In the unlikely event that an insider gained root privileges, the auditing subsystem 
could detect accesses to critical data and monitor the access or modification of logging 
and auditing configurations or logs.  In the instance of deleting the system logging or 
auditing logs, the auditing subsystem could detect the deletion of the system log, but not 
its own audit log.  After analysis of this use case, it was determined that deleting either 
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log would generate a gap in monitoring coverage that could be noted by review of the 
existing logs by security personnel and therefore monitoring by the system itself is not 
required 
All attempts where a normal user attempts to modify or disrupt the logging or 
auditing capabilities of the workstation proved to be unsuccessful.  All unsuccessful 
attempts were observed with the exceptions of reading/modifying the system and audit 
logs themselves and modifying the audit rule set.  Such attempts were denied by the 
system due to permissions, but the attempts did not generate any event messages in either 
subsystem.  A normal user could view the rsyslog configuration, but this would not 
provide any insight into whether insider threat was being monitored. 
User attempts to modify system files such as /etc/group and /etc/sudoers are 
unsuccessful due to permissions.  Of these use case scenarios, generated events only 
occurred when a user had read permission to the system file, but no write access and a 
forced write was attempted on the file.  For example, all users have access to read the 
/etc/group file to determine group membership of system accounts.  When this file is 
opened within an editor a successful event message is generated if read access is 
monitored, and an unsuccessful event message is generated when a write attempt occurs.  
No observable event messages were generated when a user attempted to add a system 
account using the command line, as the command is only executable as an administrator 
or root.  This is because the command does not perform a write command to any system 
file before it authenticates the user account attempting to add a user to the system. 
Finally, successful and unsuccessful attempts to access critical data directories 
and files were generally detectable with one caveat.  Event messages were not detectable 
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in which an insider attempted to perform an action on a file within a restricted directory.  
As the audit rules pertain to the specified file, the directory permissions prevented the 
insider from “touching” the restricted file.  An in-depth analysis and description of each 
use case is presented in Appendix E. 
4.3. Organization Specific Auditing Policy 
After analyzing the results of the use case scenario verification testing, the 
organization may now formalize a specific auditing policy pertaining to its stand-alone 
Linux workstations.  This policy includes the system log configuration and auditing rule 
set along with the key event messages to detect such actions.  In this notional example 
such a policy would include the possible insider actions listed in Table 4.1. 
4.3. Auditing and Logging Limitations 
While the auditing and logging systems could detect most of the use cases, care 
must be taken to remain aware of the limitations of the systems in question.  The system 
logging system has limited capability in detecting insider threat.  Its primary use is to 
detect attempts to gain unauthorized system access by using the su or sudo commands.  
Although the use of the su command could also be detected by setting a file watch for 
execution of the /bin/su file, or use a file watch to monitor the /var/run/utmp database for 
writes to determine if root sessions have been opened.  The later file watch would only 
detect successful attempts and may not be conducive to detecting possible threats. 
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Table 4.1.  Notional Example Logging and Auditing Policy for Insider Threat. 
Logging/Auditing Requirement Configuration Setting 
Monitoring via system logging of su and sudo command 
executions [Configuration setting for rsyslog.conf] 
Authpriv.=info      /var/log/insider.log 
Authpriv.=err        /var/log/insider.log 
Authpriv.=notice   /var/log/insider.log 
Authpriv.=alert      /var/log/insider.log 
Audit root actions in accessing critical information files 
-w /home/user1 –p rwxa 
-w /home/user1/file1 –p rwxa 
-w /home/user3 –p rwxa 
-w /home/user3/file3 –p rwxa 
-w [critical data dir path] –p rwxa 
-w [critical data file path] –p rwxa  
Audit root actions in accessing and modifying system 
logging and auditing functions 
-w /etc/audit –p wrxa 
-w /etc/audit/auditd.conf –p wrxa 
-w /etc/audit/audit.rules –p wrxa 
-w /etc/rsyslog.conf –p wxa 
-w /var/log –p rxa 
-w /var/log/insider.log –p rxa 
-w /var/log/audit –p rxa 
-w /var/log/audit/audit.log –p rxa 
Audit user attempts to remove/delete system logs Handled by audit rules for root actions 
Audit user attempts to disable system logging and 
auditing 
-a exit,always -S kill –F path=[audit daemon path] –F 
uid>=1000 
-a exit,always -S kill –F path=[rsyslog daemon path] –F 
uid>=1000 
Audit user attempts to modify system logging 
configuration 
Handled by audit rules for root actions 
Audit user write attempts to system files 
-w /etc/group –p wxa 
-w /etc/passwd –p wxa 
-w /etc/gshadow –p wxa 
-w /etc/shadow –p wxa 
-w /etc/security/opasswd –p wxa 
-w /etc/sudoers –p wxa 
-w [system file path] –p [rwxa] 
Audit user attempts to access critical information 
directories and files 
Handled by audit rules for root actions 
Audit user attempts to modify permissions to critical 
data directories and files 
Handled by audit rules for root actions 
Audit user attempts to mount external media -a entry,always –S mount –F uid>=1000 
Audit user attempts to clear account 
/home/[username]/.bash_history files 
-w /home/[username]/.bash_history –p w 
Audit user attempts to remove/delete critical data 
directories and files 
-a exit,always -S symlink -S link -S unlink -S unlinkat -S 
rename -S renameat -F  path=/home/user1 
-a exit,always -S symlink -S link -S unlink -S unlinkat -S 
rename -S renameat -F  path=/home/user1/file1 
-a exit,always -S symlink -S link -S unlink -S unlinkat -S 
rename -S renameat -F  path=/home/user3 
-a exit,always -S symlink -S link -S unlink -S unlinkat -S 
rename -S renameat -F  path=/home/user3/file3 
 
Another limitation of the auditing rule sets is the configuration rules are 
sequential and the system checks stop after the first successful condition is met.  
Therefore the order in which the rules are configured can be an issue.  Security personnel 
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must also be aware the auditing rules register events for all successful and unsuccessful 
accesses to a monitored file.  This limitation emphasizes the fact that signatures for use 
cases can play an important part in automating suspicious behavior detection as the sheer 
number of legitimate file accesses can hinder the detection of suspicious behavior. 
The auditing system allows for the monitoring of specific files, but such 
monitoring must be explicitly configured in the rule set as the subsystem cannot monitor 
newly created files without a corresponding rule.  Unlike file auditing, system call 
auditing can be filtered by specific fields, but careful consideration of the underlying 
system calls of various system commands must be examined.  Given that the same result 
can be achieved by various methods a thorough understanding of Linux system calls is 
needed to effectively use this capability. 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter provides a notional example to demonstrate the fundamental 
concepts presented in this research.  A generic organization‟s insider threat vulnerabilities 
and risks are assessed and organized to develop insider threat use cases using a defined 
risk assessment methodology.  These cases are then verified against a test system to 
determine whether such behaviors are detectable using the Linux operating system 
logging and auditing capabilities.  The verification results are then analyzed to develop 
specific auditing and logging rules tailored to meet the organization‟s needs and priorities 
and determined what key events detected indicated suspicious insider behavior.  The 
analysis also allows an organization to assess the limitations of the Linux logging and 
auditing capabilities. 
  
54 
 
 
V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter summarizes the research efforts and the research goals. First, the 
conclusion of this research and its significance are discussed.  Suggestions for possible 
future research efforts are then provided. 
5.1. Problem Summary and Research Effort 
Determining insider actions that users can perform pose a difficult problem for 
organizations. An organization‟s ability to assess insider threats is essential to an 
effective insider threat security policy.  Mitigating and discovering insider actions is 
crucial in protecting an organization‟s information system.-  A risk assessment 
methodology allows organizations to identify insider actions of concern and 
vulnerabilities specific to that organization. Organizations also need to understand the 
innate capabilities of its systems. Additionally, organizations need a method to assess the 
effectiveness of auditing and logging strategies. Knowledge of potential insider threat, as 
well as the effectiveness of insider threat auditing strategies will assist organizations in 
providing an acceptable level of information risk. 
The purpose of this research was to help define a methodology to assist 
organizations in defending against insider threat on Linux operating systems.  By 
analyzing current insider threat attacks an organization may bring to force the Linux 
operating system‟s auditing and logging capabilities.  Such capabilities tailored to an 
organization‟s assessed vulnerabilities and priorities can create an effective auditing 
policy to detect and deter insider threat. 
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5.2. Conclusions of Research 
The extension of ITFDM into an intent-based model provides organizations a 
framework to identify insider threat intentions and associated actions [3]. The notional 
example illustrated how the extended model can provide a practical means of identifying 
potential insider actions.  In identifying these potential vulnerabilities, 24 use cases were 
developed using this methodology.  Utilizing these use cases allows an organization to 
test and refine auditing and logging policies and configurations to meets its specific needs 
and responsibilities.  Signatures were also derived from the analysis of these use case 
results to allow for possible automated scanning of suspicious behavior. 
It can be inferred that an organization benefits from knowing what is being 
audited within its workstations and to ensure that the auditing complies with its security 
requirements. Because security requirements are fluid and dynamic, it would be prudent 
that once the organization has implemented this methodology into its security policy, that 
periodic reevaluations of its auditing template are performed to ensure that it still fits 
their security needs. It would behoove an organization to make it as robust as possible by 
creating numerous use case scenarios.  The more robust the organization makes this 
methodology, the more effective its insider threat security policy. 
Despite the effectiveness of this technical capability, the resulting policy and 
system configuration is not a cure all for deterring or predicting insider threat, nor is the 
detection of such acts a cure-all for the growing threat from insiders.  While the results of 
this research provide a means to detect insider threat and can provide technical 
characteristics of these attacks on a Linux system, the actual output of the auditing 
system only provides an organization with observable behavior. 
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It is the responsibility of the organization‟s security personnel to determine 
whether the pattern of recorded actions on the system and other behavioral indicators is in 
fact suspicious.  As discussed in the overview of this research study the very heart of the 
problem of insider threat is trust.  Theses possible attacks occur from trusted individuals 
who have legitimate access and authority on the system.  There is yet to be developed an 
effective and viable automated means to determine if human actions on a system are 
actual attempts to attack a system from the inside.  While the results of this research 
provide a collected and reasoned data point in determining the validity or such actions, it 
requires human intervention to determine if an insider attack has been attempted. 
5.3. Significance of Research 
Application of the methodology developed in this research provides an 
organization with a method to optimize its auditing and logging capabilities. This 
increases the organizations capability to detect and identify insider actions early enough 
to mitigate potential damages. It can also reduce the workload required to review system 
and audit logs by reducing their size in regards to insider threat. By delineating key 
characteristics in the logs to possible insider actions an organization increases its ability 
to detect malicious activity when reviewing audit logs by tailoring the recorded 
information to a specific need and purpose for the organization. Finally, it allows an 
organization to be aware of what is being audited within its information system and the 
effectiveness of the ability to detect insider threat. 
5.4. Future Research 
There are multiple areas in which this research can be expanded. As the 
methodology was demonstrated with simple use case scenarios involving a stand-alone 
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system, determining whether multiple events can be correlated into synthetic meta-events 
is a viable research path.  Such analysis to determine whether more sophisticated insider 
attacks are occurring in stages or from multiple systems is a topic not addressed in this 
research.  Another area for expansion would be to utilize the signatures developed from 
the presented use cases in an automated log parser to augment near real-time detection of 
insider threat activity on a distributed logging architecture. 
Another area of possible future research is to apply the methodology to networked 
workstations and servers to identify and customize auditing of network related 
communication within an organization. For example, lessons learned in the network 
monitoring domains can be applied to detecting insider threats across organizational web 
servers using standardized tools and a common event expression framework [44].  While 
expanding this methodology to other components involved with an enterprise-level 
network, such as routers and switches is also another possible avenue of research. By 
applying the methodology and possibly correlating such information from other 
components, an improved awareness of the auditing and logging situations in those areas 
would allow for more comprehensive situational awareness and detection techniques 
pertaining to insider threat. 
Combining the Linux auditing and logging capability to detect insider threat into 
an IDS-based application is another suggestion.  By applying the methodology to outside 
and inside threats an organization can apply auditing and logging configurations to 
provide a more reliable and well-rounded security posture while automating detection 
and mitigation procedures into a proven automated network component. Currently 
research is being conducted to configure the auditing system as a sensor that can detect 
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certain events and send notifications to a hybrid-IDS [42].  While current research into 
combing the Linux audit system with IDSs have concentrated on outside attacks, tailoring 
these efforts to include insider threat actions is a viable research effort.  Figure 5.1 [42] 
shows how the Linux auditing subsystem could tie into an intrusion detection system. 
 
 
Figure 5.1.  Audit System Data Flow. 
5.5 Summary 
This research provides organizations a methodology for customizing their 
auditing and logging capabilities to detect and deter insider threat. It provides a 
framework to create auditing rules and configure system logging to meet the needs of the 
organizations identified security requirements and priorities.  
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Appendix A:  List of Acronyms 
ARPANET – Advanced Research Projects Agency Network. 
 
BSD – Berkeley Software Distribution. 
 
CERT /CC– Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center. 
 
CIA (1) – Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability. 
 
CIA (2) – Central Intelligence Agency. 
 
CMU – Carnegie Mellon University. 
 
CSI – Computer Security Institute. 
 
CSO – Computer Security Online Magazine 
 
CUS – Component Under Study. 
 
USD – United States Dollars ($). 
 
DISA – Defense Information Systems Agency. 
 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security. 
 
DOD – Department of Defense. 
 
DOE – Department of Energy. 
 
DSS – Decision Support System. 
 
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
FIPS PUB – Federal Information Processing Standards Publication. 
 
STIG – Security Technical Implementation Guide. 
 
IATAC - Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center. 
 
IDS – Intrusion Detection System. 
 
IP – Internet Protocol. 
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IT – Information Technology. 
 
ITFDM – Insider Threat Functional Decomposition Model. 
 
NIAC – National Infrastructure Advisory Council. 
 
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology. 
 
NTAC – National Threat Assessment Center. 
 
RFC – Request For Comment. 
 
RHEL5 – Red Hat Enterprise Linux version 5. 
 
SE-Linux – Security Enhanced – Linux. 
 
SEI – Software Engineering Institute. 
 
SUT – System Under Test. 
 
TCP – Transmission Control Protocol. 
 
USSR – United Soviet Socialist Republic. 
 
USSS – United States Secret Service. 
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Appendix B:  NIST 800-30 Risk Assessment Methodology Flowchart 
 
 
Figure B.1. Risk Assessment Methodology Flowchart. 
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Appendix C:  NIST 800-30 Risk Mitigation Methodology Flowchart 
 
Figure C.1. Risk Mitigation Methodology Flowchart. 
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Appendix D:  ITFDM: Action, Alteration, Snooping, and Elevation 
Figures D.1 – D.4 [3] are the functionally decomposed malicious insider four 
protection state models. 
 
Figure D.1. Insider Threat Decomposed Alteration Model. 
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Figure D.2. Insider Threat Distribution Alteration Model. 
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Figure D.3. Insider Threat Distribution Snooping Model. 
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Figure D.4. Insider Threat Distribution Elevation Model. 
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Appendix E:  Insider Threat Use Cases 
Scenario 1 
A user that possesses the root password uses the su command in a terminal window.  Use 
of the su command is prohibited by current security policy. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User wbai logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “su” on command line 
4. User inputs root password 
5. User exits root session by using the “exit” command 
 
Results: 
Authpriv.info [rsyslog] 
Feb  7 18:21:01 ubuntu su[2349]: Successful su for root by wbai 
Feb  7 18:21:01 ubuntu su[2349]: + /dev/pts/0 wbai:root 
Feb  7 18:21:01 ubuntu su[2349]: pam_unix(su:session): session opened 
for user root by wbai(uid=1000) 
Feb  7 18:21:25 ubuntu su[2349]: pam_unix(su:session): session closed 
for user root 
 
Audit Log (watching writes to /var/run/utmp) 
time->Mon Feb  8 19:33:10 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265686390.605:992): item=0 name="/var/run/utmp" 
inode=2708 dev=00:12 mode=0100664 ouid=0 ogid=43 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265686390.605:992):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265686390.605:992): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=3 a0=dd0eba a1=88000 a2=f a3=dd0ec0 items=1 ppid=2457 
pid=2690 auid=4294967295 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 
egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="su" 
exe="/bin/su" key="session” 
---- 
time->Mon Feb  8 19:33:12 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265686392.446:997): item=0 name="/var/run/utmp" 
inode=2708 dev=00:12 mode=0100664 ouid=0 ogid=43 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265686392.446:997):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265686392.446:997): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=3 a0=dd0eba a1=88000 a2=1 a3=dd0ec0 items=1 ppid=2457 
pid=2690 auid=4294967295 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 
egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="su" 
exe="/bin/su" key=”session” 
 
Analysis: 
Both the system logging and auditing system captured this scenario.  The system logs 
show the successful event of the “su” command and the opening and closing of the root 
session.  With the auditing events the success of the “su” command is inferred by the 
opening and closing events registered of the root session.  While the results for the 
system logging events are obvious, some interpretation of the audit log is required.   
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The audit log record shows a session was opened by watching for writes to the 
/var/run/utmp database.  The success field shows the command was successfully 
executed, the exe field shows the resolved pathname for the command, and the uid 
identifies the user executing the command.  It is inferred the second audit entry is the 
closing of the session as the pid field has the same value for both entries. 
 
An audit file watch rule to monitor the execution of the /bin/su file could also monitor for 
this scenario. 
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Scenario 2 
A user that does not possess the root password uses the “su” command in a terminal 
window.  Use of the “su” command is prohibited by current security policy. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User wbai logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “su” on command line 
4. User inputs a false root password. 
 
Results: 
Authpriv.err [rsyslog] 
Feb  7 16:40:31 ubuntu su[2459]: pam_authenticate: Authentication 
failure 
 
Authpriv.notice [rsyslog] 
Feb  7 19:09:07 ubuntu su[2514]: pam_unix(su:auth): authentication 
failure; logname=wbai uid=1000 euid=0 tty=/dev/pts/2 ruser=wbai rhost=  
user=root 
Feb  7 19:09:08 ubuntu su[2514]: FAILED su for root by wbai 
Feb  7 19:09:08 ubuntu su[2514]: - /dev/pts/2 wbai:root 
 
Audit system did not capture any events for this session. 
 
Analysis: 
The system log captured a pam authentication error at both levels for the authpriv facility, 
but only the notice level events show a failed attempt to use the “su” command. 
 
The auditing system did not capture failed events as a failed attempt would not open a 
session causing a write to occur to the /var/run/utmp database.  Again, as noted in the 
scenario 1 analysis, a file watch on /bin/su for execution would suffice to capture both 
successful and unsuccessful attempts.  This is only possible since the use of the “su” 
command is prohibited under all circumstances. 
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Scenario 3 
An authorized user uses the “sudo” command without a valid password in a terminal 
window.  Use of the “sudo” command is allowed for admin personnel listed in 
/etc/sudoers. 
This scenario would simulate a user leaving the workstation unattended and unsecured, 
while an insider attempted to exploit the authorized user‟s authority without knowing the 
authorized user‟s password. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User wbai (authorized admin listed in /etc/sudoers) logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “sudo -i” (opens a root shell) on command line 
4. User inputs invalid user password (3 attempts) 
 
Results: 
Authpriv.notice [rsyslog] 
Feb  7 16:40:31 ubuntu su[2459]: FAILED su for root by wbai 
Feb  7 16:40:31 ubuntu su[2459]: - /dev/pts/0 wbai:root 
Feb  7 16:40:38 ubuntu su[2461]: pam_unix(su:auth): authentication 
failure; logname=wbai uid=1000 euid=0 tty=/dev/pts/0 ruser=wbai rhost=  
user=root 
Feb  7 16:40:40 ubuntu su[2461]: FAILED su for root by wbai 
Feb  7 16:40:40 ubuntu su[2461]: - /dev/pts/0 wbai:root 
Feb  7 16:40:47 ubuntu su[2465]: pam_unix(su:auth): authentication 
failure; logname=wbai uid=1000 euid=0 tty=/dev/pts/0 ruser=wbai rhost=  
user=root 
Feb  7 16:40:50 ubuntu su[2465]: FAILED su for root by wbai 
Feb  7 16:40:50 ubuntu su[2465]: - /dev/pts/0 wbai:root 
Feb  7 16:40:54 ubuntu su[2466]: pam_unix(su:auth): authentication 
failure; logname=wbai uid=1000 euid=0 tty=/dev/pts/0 ruser=wbai rhost=  
user=root 
 
Authpriv.alert [rsyslog] 
Feb  7 19:10:31 ubuntu sudo:     wbai : 3 incorrect password attempts ; 
TTY=pts/2 ; PWD=/home/wbai ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/bin/bash 
 
Audit system did not capture any events for this session. 
 
Analysis: 
The events recorded at the notice level represent the “sudo” command‟s attempt to run a 
command at the root level.  The alert level message properly defines the attempt as a user 
inputting the “sudo” command without the proper password, but will only register after 
three attempts are made.  The notice level messages can be interpreted as unsuccessful 
attempts at using the “su” or “sudo” commands.  Since the notice level messages do not 
delineate which command is used, suspicion of insider attacks would be warranted at 
multiple attempts to use either command unsuccessfully.  Inferring from the system log 
messages monitoring the /bin/su file in scenarios 1 and 2 would not be recommended as 
the command is used for the “sudo” command as well. 
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Scenario 4 
Unauthorized user attempts to use “sudo” command with a valid user password. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User user1 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “sudo -i” (opens a root shell) on command line 
4. User inputs valid user password 
 
Results: 
Authpriv.alert 
Feb  7 19:12:12 ubuntu sudo:    user1 : user NOT in sudoers ; TTY=pts/2 
; PWD=/home/wbai ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/xterm 
 
Audit system did not capture any events for this session. 
 
Analysis: 
This result is straightforward in its analysis. 
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Note:  All results in scenarios 5 to 24 did not register any events in the system logs.  
All recorded events were generated by the auditing subsystem in the audit log. 
 
Scenario 5 
Admin or root attempts to access user1 directory and file1.  File1 in user1 home directory 
has permission setting “600” (owner read/write only). 
 
Procedure: 
1. User wbai (authorized admin) logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “cd ../user1” (relative pathname) on command line 
4. User types “ls ../user1” (relative pathname) on command line 
5. User types “cat ../user1/file1” (relative pathname) on command line 
6. User types “su” and inputs root password 
7. User types “cd ../user1” (relative pathname) on command line 
8. User types “ls ../user1” (relative pathname) on command line 
9. User types “cat ../user1/file1” (relative pathname) on command line 
10. User exits root shell 
 
Results: 
User wbai "ls" on "/home/user1" 
time->Mon Feb  8 13:47:52 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265665672.574:1599): item=0 name="../user1" 
inode=146870 dev=08:01 mode=040700 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265665672.574:1599):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265665672.574:1599): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=no exit=-13 a0=9518e30 a1=98800 a2=b788b694 a3=9518e18 items=1 
ppid=2798 pid=2987 auid=4294967295 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 
suid=1000 fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts2 
ses=4294967295 comm="ls" exe="/bin/ls" key="user1" 
 
User wbai “cat” on “/home/user1/file1” 
Permission denied.  No events generated. 
 
Root "ls" on "/home/user1" 
time->Mon Feb  8 13:48:35 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265665715.422:1621): item=0 name="." inode=146870 
dev=08:01 mode=040700 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265665715.422:1621):  cwd="/home/user1" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265665715.422:1621): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=3 a0=9e68dd8 a1=98800 a2=b77e3694 a3=9e6ce18 items=1 
ppid=3001 pid=3013 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 
egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="ls" exe="/bin/ls" 
key="user1" 
 
Root “cat” on “/home/user1/file1” 
time->Mon Feb  8 19:25:58 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265685958.665:839): item=0 name="../user1/file1" 
inode=133713 dev=08:01 mode=0100600 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
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type=CWD msg=audit(1265685958.665:839):  cwd="/home/user3" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265685958.665:839): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=3 a0=bfb476ce a1=8000 a2=0 a3=bfb4580c items=1 
ppid=2584 pid=2609 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 
egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="cat" exe="/bin/cat" 
key="user1" 
 
Analysis: 
For either wbai or root, the “cd” command did not generate an event, but as soon as a 
command entered requiring reading the directory contents (ie. “ls” command) an event 
was recorded.  User wbai (admin privileges) was not allowed to access user1 directory 
due to permissions, but root was allowed.  Both the successful and unsuccessful attempts 
to access the directory were recorded.  No events were recorded for user wbai‟s attempts 
to access the file.  This is due to the fact that the rule monitoring the file never activated 
as user wbai could not access the directory, much less the file.  Root accessing the file 
was successfully monitored by the auditing system. 
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Scenario 6 
Admin or root attempts to modify system logging (/etc/rsyslog.conf) and audit rule 
(/etc/audit/audit.rules) sets. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User wbai (authorized admin) logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “vi /etc/rsyslog.conf” (system logging configuration) on command line 
4. User inserts text and writes with a force quit 
5. User types “vi /etc/audit/audit.rules” (auditing rule set) on command line 
6. User inserts text and writes with a force quit 
7. User types “su” and inputs root password 
8. User types “vi /etc/rsyslog.conf” (system logging configuration) on command line 
9. User inserts text and writes with a force quit 
10. User types “vi /etc/audit/audit.rules” (auditing rule set) on command line 
11. User inserts text and writes with a force quit 
12. User exits root shell 
 
Results: 
User wbai “vi” on “/etc/rsyslog.conf” 
time->Mon Feb 22 01:47:09 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266832029.629:969): item=0 
name="/etc/rsyslog.conf" inode=88947 dev=08:01 mode=0100644 ouid=0 
ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266832029.629:969):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266832029.629:969): arch=40000003 syscall=85 
success=no exit=-22 a0=bfda0e6c a1=bfda1e6c a2=fff a3=1 items=1 
ppid=2336 pid=2587 auid=4294967295 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 
suid=1000 fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts0 
ses=4294967295 comm="vi" exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="syslog" 
 
User wbai “vi” on “/etc/audit/audit.rules” 
Permission denied.  No events generated. 
 
Root “vi” on “/etc/rsyslog.conf‟ 
time->Mon Feb 22 01:34:44 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266831284.641:481): item=0 
name="/etc/rsyslog.conf" inode=88947 dev=08:01 mode=0100644 ouid=0 
ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266831284.641:481):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266831284.641:481): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=3 a0=843aa90 a1=0 a2=0 a3=1 items=1 ppid=2416 pid=2430 
auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 
tty=pts0 ses=4294967295 comm="vi" exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="syslog" 
 
Root “vi” on “/etc/audit/audit.rules” 
time->Mon Feb 22 01:35:18 2010 
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type=PATH msg=audit(1266831318.189:502): item=0 
name="/etc/audit/audit.rules" inode=133782 dev=08:01 mode=0100640 
ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266831318.189:502):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266831318.189:502): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=3 a0=8837a98 a1=0 a2=0 a3=1 items=1 ppid=2416 pid=2435 
auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 
tty=pts0 ses=4294967295 comm="vi" exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="audit" 
 
Analysis: 
User wbai has read access to /etc/rsyslog.conf but no write access.  Any attempt by wbai 
to write to /etc/rsyslog.conf will result in an unsuccessful attempt recorded.  User wbai 
had no access to /etc/audit/audit.rules and did not generate any events.  Root had access 
and the auditing system recorded successful write attempts to both files.  Actual or 
attempted modifications made to the files are unknown.  If modifications are successful, a 
sound backup copy is needed to compare to the active configurations. 
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Scenario 7 
Admin or root attempts to modify system log and audit log 
 
Procedure: 
1. User wbai (authorized admin) logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “vi /var/log/syslog.all.log” (system log) on command line 
4. User inserts text and writes with a force quit 
5. User types “vi /var/log/audit/audit.log” (audit log) on command line 
6. User inserts text and writes with a force quit 
7. User types “su” and inputs root password 
8. User types “vi /var/log/syslog.all.log” (system log) on command line 
9. User inserts text and writes with a force quit 
10. User types “vi /var/log/audit/audit.log” (audit log) on command line 
11. User inserts text and writes with a force quit 
12. User exits root shell 
 
Results: 
User wbai “vi” on “/var/log/syslog.all.log” 
time->Mon Feb 22 01:47:09 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266832029.629:969): item=0 
name="/etc/rsyslog.conf" inode=88947 dev=08:01 mode=0100644 ouid=0 
ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266832029.629:969):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266832029.629:969): arch=40000003 syscall=85 
success=no exit=-22 a0=bfda0e6c a1=bfda1e6c a2=fff a3=1 items=1 
ppid=2336 pid=2587 auid=4294967295 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 
suid=1000 fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts0 
ses=4294967295 comm="vi" exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="syslog" 
 
User wbai “vi” on “/var/log/audit/audit.log” 
Permission denied.  No events generated. 
 
Root “vi” on “/var/log/syslog.all.log” 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265665818.196:1638): item=0 name="/var/log/" 
inode=120515 dev=08:01 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265665818.196:1638):  cwd="/home" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265665818.196:1638): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=5 a0=9915128 a1=c1 a2=1a0 a3=9915128 items=2 ppid=3001 
pid=3021 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 
sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="vi" 
exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="syslog" 
 
Root “vi” on “/var/log/audit/audit.log” 
time->Mon Feb  8 13:50:41 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265665841.769:1655): item=0 
name="/var/log/audit/audit.log" inode=130093 dev=08:01 mode=0100600 
ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265665841.769:1655):  cwd="/home" 
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type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265665841.769:1655): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=3 a0=9950aa0 a1=0 a2=0 a3=1 items=1 ppid=3001 pid=3027 
auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 
tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="vi" exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="audit" 
 
Analysis: 
Again, user wbai was allowed to read the system log file, but does not have access to the 
audit log.  If a forced write is executed on the system log an audit event is generated, but 
is unsuccessful.  Root actions to modify both logs are recorded, although what 
modifications are made are unknown without a backup copy for comparison. 
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Scenario 8 
Admin or root attempts to clear system log and audit log. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User wbai (authorized admin) logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “rm /var/log/syslog.all.log” (system log) on command line 
4. Examine logs 
5. User types “rm /var/log/audit/audit.log” (audit log) on command line 
6. Examine logs 
7. User types “su” and inputs root password 
8. User types “rm /var/log/syslog.all.log” (system log) on command line 
9. Examine logs 
10. User types “rm /var/log/audit/audit.log” (audit log) on command line 
11. Examine logs 
12. User exits root shell 
 
Results: 
User wbai “rm” on “/var/log/syslog.all.log” 
time->Mon Feb 22 02:32:21 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266834741.737:1300): item=1 
name="/var/log/syslog.all.log" inode=1654 dev=08:01 mode=0100640 
ouid=101 ogid=4 rdev=00:00 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266834741.737:1300): item=0 name="/var/log/" 
inode=120515 dev=08:01 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266834741.737:1300):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266834741.737:1300): arch=40000003 syscall=301 
success=no exit=-13 a0=ffffff9c a1=bff396e9 a2=0 a3=bff396e9 items=2 
ppid=2336 pid=2794 auid=4294967295 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 
suid=1000 fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts0 
ses=4294967295 comm="rm" exe="/bin/rm" key="delete" 
 
User wbai “rm” on “/var/log/audit/audit.log” 
Permission denied.  No events generated. 
 
Root “rm” on “/var/log/syslog.all.log” 
time->Mon Feb 22 02:38:10 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266835090.417:1406): item=1 
name="/var/log/syslog.all.log" inode=1654 dev=08:01 mode=0100640 
ouid=101 ogid=4 rdev=00:00 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266835090.417:1406): item=0 name="/var/log/" 
inode=120515 dev=08:01 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266835090.417:1406):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266835090.417:1406): arch=40000003 syscall=301 
success=yes exit=0 a0=ffffff9c a1=bf9ca9d5 a2=0 a3=bf9ca9d5 items=2 
ppid=2336 pid=2895 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 
egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=4294967295 comm="rm" exe="/bin/rm" 
key="delete" 
---- 
time->Mon Feb 22 02:36:29 2010 
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type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1266834989.794:1384): auid=4294967295 
ses=4294967295 op="add rule" key="syslog" list=4 res=1 
 
Root “rm” on “/var/log/audit/audit.log” 
Command successful, no audit.log file in directory. 
 
Analysis: 
User wbai did not have write access to /var/log/syslog.all.log and generated an 
unsuccessful event, while failing to generate any event in the attempt to delete 
/var/log/audit/audit.log due to lack of permissions to the file. 
Root removed the syslog file and generated 2 related events in the audit log.  The first 
event watched for any execution of the system calls related to deletion and the other 
event generated when a change to the existing audit rule monitoring the syslog file was 
changed due to the change in value of the inode.  While root did delete the audit log, no 
event was generated.  For both log deletions by root, the respective log files were not 
automatically created and both service daemons needed to be restarted to function 
properly. 
The gap in system log and/or audit log time coverage would be an indicator for 
suspicious activity. 
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Scenario 9 
User attempts to read system log and audit log. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “cat /var/log/syslog.all.log” (system log) on command line 
4. User types “cat /var/log/audit/audit.log” (audit log) on command line 
5. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User2 permission denied no record of attempts for both log files. 
 
Analysis: 
Due to user2‟s lack of authority, unsuccessful attempts to read these files will not be 
recorded, but as was proven with root access reads, successful attempts will be recorded. 
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Scenario 10 
User attempts to modify system log and audit log. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “vi /var/log/syslog.all.log” (system log) on command line 
4. If step 3 successful, user inserts text and writes with a force quit 
5. User types “vi /var/log/audit/audit.log” (audit log) on command line 
6. If step 5 successful, user inserts text and writes with a force quit 
7. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User2 has permission denied, no record of attempts for both files. 
 
Analysis: 
Due to user2‟s lack of authority, unsuccessful attempts to modify these files will not be 
recorded, but as was proven with root access modifies, successful attempts will be 
recorded. 
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Scenario 11 
User attempts to clear system log and audit log. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “rm /var/log/syslog.all.log” (system log) on command line 
4. Examine logs 
5. User types “rm /var/log/audit/audit.log” (audit log) on command line 
6. Examine logs 
7. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User2 “rm” on “/var/log/syslog.all.log” 
time->Fri Feb 12 10:18:09 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265998689.002:990): item=1 
name="/var/log/syslog.all.log" inode=1654 dev=08:01 mode=0100640 
ouid=101 ogid=4 rdev=00:00 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265998689.002:990): item=0 name="/var/log/" 
inode=120515 dev=08:01 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265998689.002:990):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265998689.002:990): arch=40000003 syscall=301 
success=no exit=-13 a0=ffffff9c a1=bffe06d1 a2=0 a3=bffe06d1 items=2 
ppid=2418 pid=2601 auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 
suid=1002 fsuid=1002 egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 
ses=4294967295 comm="rm" exe="/bin/rm" key="delete" 
 
User2 “rm” on “/var/log/audit/audit.log” 
User2 has permission denied, no record of attempt. 
 
Analysis: 
Events were generated for user2 attempts to delete the system log file as users have 
permission to the /var/log directory, but lack write permissions to the log files.  Events 
for deletion attempts of the /var/log/audit/audit.log failed to generate due to lack of 
permissions to the /var/log/audit directory. 
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Scenario 12 
User attempts to stop/disable rsyslog and/or auditing daemon 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User type “ps –ef” and notes process IDs for both ryslogd and auditd 
4. User types “kill [rsyslogd pid]” (system log daemon) on command line 
5. User types “kill [auditd pid]” (audit log daemon) on command line 
6. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User2 “kill” on rsyslogd 
time->Fri Feb 12 10:29:51 2010 
type=OBJ_PID msg=audit(1265999391.751:1617): opid=650 oauid=-1 ouid=101 
oses=-1 obj=(none) ocomm="rsyslogd" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265999391.751:1617): arch=40000003 syscall=37 
success=no exit=-1 a0=28a a1=f a2=28a a3=0 items=0 ppid=2409 pid=2418 
auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 suid=1002 fsuid=1002 
egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="bash" 
exe="/bin/bash" key="kill" 
 
User2 “kill” on auditd 
time->Fri Feb 12 10:28:10 2010 
type=OBJ_PID msg=audit(1265999290.203:1599): opid=2768 oauid=-1 ouid=0 
oses=-1 obj=(none) ocomm="auditd" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265999290.203:1599): arch=40000003 syscall=37 
success=no exit=-1 a0=ad0 a1=f a2=ad0 a3=0 items=0 ppid=2409 pid=2418 
auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 suid=1002 fsuid=1002 
egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="bash" 
exe="/bin/bash" key="kill" 
 
Analysis: 
Events were generated due to a system call watch on the “kill” command.  This will 
generate events for all “kill” commands occurring on the system.  As a “kill” command 
would normally be executed by an administrator, any attempts by normal users would be 
suspicious.  If for example all normal users have uid >= 2000, and all admins have 1000 
>= uid < 2000, then a filter on the system call may be devised to only capture “kill” 
command attempts by normal users. 
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Scenario 13 
User attempts to modify system log and audit configuration 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “vi /etc/rsyslog.conf” (system logging configuraton) on command line 
4. If step 3 successful, user inserts text and writes with a force quit 
5. User types “vi /etc/audit/audit.rules” (auditing rule set) on command line 
6. If step 3 successful, user inserts text and writes with a force quit 
7. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User2 “vi” on “/etc/rsyslog.conf” 
time->Fri Feb 12 10:37:03 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265999823.405:1676): item=0 
name="/etc/rsyslog.conf" inode=88947 dev=08:01 mode=0100644 ouid=0 
ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265999823.405:1676):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265999823.405:1676): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=yes exit=3 a0=9fedab0 a1=0 a2=0 a3=1 items=1 ppid=2418 pid=2843 
auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 suid=1002 fsuid=1002 
egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 comm="vi" 
exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="syslog" 
---- 
time->Fri Feb 12 10:37:10 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265999830.824:1680): item=0 
name="/etc/rsyslog.conf" inode=88947 dev=08:01 mode=0100644 ouid=0 
ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265999830.824:1680):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265999830.824:1680): arch=40000003 syscall=85 
success=no exit=-22 a0=bf8d2c3c a1=bf8d3c3c a2=fff a3=1 items=1 
ppid=2418 pid=2843 auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 
suid=1002 fsuid=1002 egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 
ses=4294967295 comm="vi" exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="syslog" 
 
User2 “vi” on “/etc/audit/audit.rules” 
User has permission denied, no record of attempts for audit.rules 
 
Analysis: 
Users have read access to the syslog configuration file, but no write access.  A successful 
“vi” event is recorded as the program reads the file and an unsuccessful “vi” event is 
recorded due to an attempt to write to the file. 
Again, no events are recorded for the audit rule set as the user lacks permissions for the 
/etc/audit directory. 
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Scenario 14 
User attempts to add user to system 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “adduser” on command line 
4. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User has permission denied, no record of attempts 
 
Analysis: 
User attempts to add users via the GUI will fail as the necessary options are grayed out 
due to the lack of permission of the normal user.  However attempts may still be made via 
the command line.  However the user still lacks permissions as only admin group or root 
may add users to the system via command line. 
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Scenario 15 
User attempts to modify user/group information  
(/etc/group, /etc/passwd, /etc/gshadow, /etc/shadow, /etc/sudoers, /etc/security/opasswd) 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “vi [filename]” on command line 
4. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User has permission denied, no record of attempts for all files except /etc/passwd and 
/etc/group 
 
User2 attempts to modify /etc/group with forced write 
time->Fri Feb 12 11:12:44 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266001964.526:1925): item=0 name="/etc/group" 
inode=88990 dev=08:01 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266001964.526:1925):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266001964.526:1925): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=no exit=-13 a0=9554a18 a1=241 a2=1a4 a3=81a4 items=1 ppid=2418 
pid=3011 auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 suid=1002 
fsuid=1002 egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 ses=4294967295 
comm="vi" exe="/usr/bin/vim.tiny" key="identity" 
 
Analysis: 
User2 had access to read both /etc/passwd and /etc/group, but no write permission.  Audit 
would record event if a forced write was attempted (“:w!”).  Other files were not recorded 
and not allowed access.  
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Scenario 16 
User A attempts to access User B directory 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “ls ../user1” (relative pathname) on command line 
4. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User user2 "ls" on "/home/user1" 
time->Fri Feb 12 10:10:56 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265998256.018:764): item=0 name="../user1" 
inode=146870 dev=08:01 mode=040700 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265998256.018:764):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265998256.018:764): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=no exit=-13 a0=8df9e30 a1=98800 a2=b784c694 a3=8df9e18 items=1 
ppid=2418 pid=2443 auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 
suid=1002 fsuid=1002 egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 
ses=4294967295 comm="ls" exe="/bin/ls" key="user1" 
 
Analysis: 
The unsuccessful attempt to access User1 directory generates an event noting the uid of 
the account attempting the directory read.  Such unsuccessful attempts to access restricted 
directories may indicate suspicious behavior. 
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Scenario 17 
User A attempts to read User B file without group access or file access. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “cat ../user1/file1” (relative filename) on command line 
4. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
Permission denied, no events are generated. 
 
Analysis: 
As with similar attempts made by admin users in scenario 5, no events are generated due 
to lack of access to the directory in which the file resides. 
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Scenario 18 
Unauthorized user attempts to read a restricted file (group access, no file access) 
 
Procedure: 
1. User1 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “cd ../user3” (relative filename) on command line 
4. User types “cat file3” on command line 
5. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User1 “cat” on “file3” 
time->Fri Feb 12 14:55:26 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266015326.818:598): item=0 name="file3" 
inode=133714 dev=08:01 mode=0100600 ouid=1003 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266015326.818:598):  cwd="/home/user3" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266015326.818:598): arch=40000003 syscall=5 
success=no exit=-13 a0=bfe626cf a1=8000 a2=0 a3=bfe6221c items=1 
ppid=2316 pid=2347 auid=4294967295 uid=1001 gid=1001 euid=1001 
suid=1001 fsuid=1001 egid=1001 sgid=1001 fsgid=1001 tty=pts0 
ses=4294967295 comm="cat" exe="/bin/cat" key="user3" 
 
Analysis: 
Unsuccessful attempts to read restricted files are recorded.  Again, numerous 
unsuccessful attempts may indicate suspicious behavior and allow targeted monitoring of 
users attempting such actions. 
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Scenario 19 
User2 attempts to modify user1 directory permissions. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “chmod 666 ../user1” (relative filename) on command line 
4. User types “chown user2 ../user1” (relative filename) on command line 
5. User types “chgrp group2 ../user1” (relative filename) on command line 
6. User exits shell 
 
 
Results: 
User2 “chmod” on “/home/user1” 
time->Fri Feb 12 11:18:30 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266002310.183:1974): item=0 name="/home/user1" 
inode=146870 dev=08:01 mode=040700 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266002310.183:1974):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266002310.183:1974): arch=40000003 syscall=306 
success=no exit=-1 a0=ffffff9c a1=87d6130 a2=1ff a3=87d6130 items=1 
ppid=2418 pid=3056 auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 
suid=1002 fsuid=1002 egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 
ses=4294967295 comm="chmod" exe="/bin/chmod" key="perm_mod" 
 
User2 “chown” on “/home/user1” 
time->Fri Feb 12 11:18:49 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266002329.786:1981): item=0 name="/home/user1" 
inode=146870 dev=08:01 mode=040700 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266002329.786:1981):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266002329.786:1981): arch=40000003 syscall=298 
success=no exit=-1 a0=ffffff9c a1=969d8e0 a2=3ea a3=ffffffff items=1 
ppid=2418 pid=3063 auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 
suid=1002 fsuid=1002 egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 
ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key="perm_mod" 
 
User2 “chgrp” on “/home/user1” 
time->Fri Feb 12 11:19:02 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266002342.050:1984): item=0 name="/home/user1" 
inode=146870 dev=08:01 mode=040700 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266002342.050:1984):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266002342.050:1984): arch=40000003 syscall=298 
success=no exit=-1 a0=ffffff9c a1=90a08d0 a2=ffffffff a3=3ea items=1 
ppid=2418 pid=3064 auid=4294967295 uid=1002 gid=1002 euid=1002 
suid=1002 fsuid=1002 egid=1002 sgid=1002 fsgid=1002 tty=pts2 
ses=4294967295 comm="chgrp" exe="/bin/chgrp" key="perm_mod" 
 
Analysis: 
Any attempt to change attributes of a restricted directory is recorded.  However, due to 
the limitation of the auditing subsystem, file watch rules will record both successful and 
unsuccessful attempts of reads, writes, executes, or attribute changes or any combination 
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of these rights.  As such attribute changes should not be a common occurrence and may 
indicate suspicious behavior. 
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Scenario 20 
User2 attempts to modify file1 permissions without group access or file access. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “chmod 666 ../user1/file1” (relative filename) on command line 
4. User types “chown user2 ../user1/file1” (relative filename) on command line 
5. User types “chgrp group2 ../user1/file1” (relative filename) on command line 
6. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User has permission denied, no record of attempts. 
 
Analysis: 
As with similar attempts made by admin users in scenario 5, no events are generated due 
to lack of access to the directory in which the file resides. 
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Scenario 21 
User1 attempts to modify file3 permissions (group access and no file access) 
 
Procedure: 
1. User1 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “cd ../user3” (relative pathname) 
4. User types “chmod 666 file3” on command line 
5. User types “chown user1 file3” on command line 
6. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User1 “chmod” on “file3” 
time->Fri Feb 12 14:55:37 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266015337.096:609): item=0 name="file3" 
inode=133714 dev=08:01 mode=0100600 ouid=1003 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266015337.096:609):  cwd="/home/user3" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266015337.096:609): arch=40000003 syscall=306 
success=no exit=-1 a0=ffffff9c a1=9c5f130 a2=1b0 a3=9c5f130 items=1 
ppid=2316 pid=2357 auid=4294967295 uid=1001 gid=1001 euid=1001 
suid=1001 fsuid=1001 egid=1001 sgid=1001 fsgid=1001 tty=pts0 
ses=4294967295 comm="chmod" exe="/bin/chmod" key="perm_mod" 
 
User1 “chown” on “file3” 
time->Fri Feb 12 14:55:50 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266015350.905:615): item=0 name="file3" 
inode=133714 dev=08:01 mode=0100600 ouid=1003 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266015350.905:615):  cwd="/home/user3" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266015350.905:615): arch=40000003 syscall=298 
success=no exit=-1 a0=ffffff9c a1=8a418e0 a2=3e9 a3=ffffffff items=1 
ppid=2316 pid=2363 auid=4294967295 uid=1001 gid=1001 euid=1001 
suid=1001 fsuid=1001 egid=1001 sgid=1001 fsgid=1001 tty=pts0 
ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key="perm_mod" 
 
Analysis: 
Unsuccessful attempts to modify restricted file attributes are recorded.  Again, numerous 
unsuccessful attempts may indicate suspicious behavior and allow targeted monitoring of 
users attempting such actions. 
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Scenario 22 
User attempts to mount external flash media (external media is prohibited by security 
policy) 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User plugs in a USB Flash Drive 
3. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
time->Mon Feb  8 16:28:18 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265675298.444:32): item=1 name=(null) inode=11668 
dev=00:0f mode=060660 ouid=0 ogid=6 rdev=08:11 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265675298.444:32): item=0 name="/media/DEANNABAI" 
inode=146918 dev=08:01 mode=040700 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265675298.444:32):  cwd="/" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265675298.444:32): arch=40000003 syscall=21 
success=yes exit=0 a0=8916260 a1=8916270 a2=8916288 a3=c0ed0006 items=2 
ppid=1691 pid=2699 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 
egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="mount" 
exe="/bin/mount" key="export" 
 
Analysis: 
Any automount operation is performed at the root level.  As the introduction of external 
media is prohibited any event recorded by this auditing rule can be deemed as suspicious 
behavior. 
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Scenario 23 
User1 clears /home/user1/.bash_history file. 
 
Procedure: 
1. User1 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “rm .bash_history” 
4. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
time->Mon Feb  8 19:33:29 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265686409.665:1030): item=1 name=".bash_history" 
inode=132715 dev=08:01 mode=0100600 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=PATH msg=audit(1265686409.665:1030): item=0 name="/home/user1" 
inode=146870 dev=08:01 mode=040700 ouid=1001 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1265686409.665:1030):  cwd="/home/user1" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1265686409.665:1030): arch=40000003 syscall=301 
success=yes exit=0 a0=ffffff9c a1=bfa1d6c9 a2=0 a3=bfa1d6c9 items=2 
ppid=2700 pid=2723 auid=4294967295 uid=1001 gid=1001 euid=1001 
suid=1001 fsuid=1001 egid=1001 sgid=1001 fsgid=1001 tty=pts2 
ses=4294967295 comm="rm" exe="/bin/rm" key="delete" 
---- 
time->Wed Nov 18 09:59:16 2009 
type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1258567156.321:98): auid=4294967295 
ses=4294967295 op="updated rules" path="/home/user1/.bash_history" 
key="user1history" list=4 res=1 
 
Analysis: 
As noted before with the deletion of the system log file by root, 2 related events are 
generated.  The first event watched for any execution of the system calls related to 
deletion and the other event generated when a change to the existing audit rule 
monitoring the history file was changed due to the change in value of the inode.  The 
usefulness of monitoring this file is not recreating the commands executed by the user.  
This is useful within a very limited timeframe depending upon the settings for the history 
file, but more for the indicator that a user is actively trying to hide their actions. 
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Scenario 24 
Unauthorized user attempts to delete a file with and without group access 
 
Procedure: 
1. User2 logs into the system 
2. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
3. User types “rm ../user1/file1” 
4. User2 logs out 
5. User1 logs into the sytem 
6. User opens terminal window via drop down menu on GUI desktop 
7. User types “rm ../user3/file3” 
8. User exits shell 
 
Results: 
User2 “rm” on “/home/user1/file1” 
Permission denied, no events generated. 
 
User1 “rm” on “/home/user3/file3” 
time->Mon Feb 22 04:08:49 2010 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266840529.634:2002): item=1 name="../user3/file3" 
inode=133714 dev=08:01 mode=0100600 ouid=1003 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=PATH msg=audit(1266840529.634:2002): item=0 name="../user3/" 
inode=146872 dev=08:01 mode=040750 ouid=1003 ogid=1001 rdev=00:00 
type=CWD msg=audit(1266840529.634:2002):  cwd="/home/wbai" 
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1266840529.634:2002): arch=40000003 syscall=301 
success=no exit=-13 a0=ffffff9c a1=bfb896da a2=0 a3=bfb896da items=2 
ppid=3511 pid=3531 auid=4294967295 uid=1001 gid=1001 euid=1001 
suid=1001 fsuid=1001 egid=1001 sgid=1001 fsgid=1001 tty=pts0 
ses=4294967295 comm="rm" exe="/bin/rm" key="delete" 
 
Analysis: 
As with previous scenarios, user2‟s attempts to delete file1 failed to register events due to 
its lack of access to the directory.  User1‟s attempts to delete file3 are recorded due to the 
system call watch on the deletion system calls.  This may also be recorded by monitoring 
write attempts to the file itself as well. 
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